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Toward a More Colorblind Society?: Congressional
Redistricting After Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera
Many question whether the civil rights movement has gone
too far and behave as if the history of discrimination is the
history of discrimination against white men.... Indeed, race
relations is the only major social ill today we are considering
curing by denial, as if declaring ourselves colorblind in law
will make us colorblind in fact. And the pattern-routinely
from the Congress and often from the courts-seems to be a
pious acknowledgment of the existence of discrimination
followed by outraged condemnation of any effort to do
anything about it.'
-Deval L. Patrick
For thirty years the states, the Department of Justice, the federal
courts, and the Supreme Court have struggled to balance the Voting
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause While the Supreme
Court and the Justice Department seek the same goal-a colorblind
society-the means that each believes necessary to achieve this end
are vastly different. Between these two camps are the states, where
the legislators struggle to balance the requirements that each side
imposes on the other. What began as an effort to improve
representative democracy is now a battle zone where victory is
uncertain and the rules for future engagements remain unclear.
Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I1)' and Bush v. Vera,5 the two most recent
Supreme Court opinions in this area, continue the fight but may not
have finished the war.
1. Deval L Patrick, Remarks Before the National Conference of State Legislatures
Annual Meeting Reapportionment Task Force Program (July 29, 1996), (text available
from the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division) [hereinafter Remarks of Deval
Patrick]. At the time of his speech before the National Conference of State Legislatures,
Deval Patrick was the Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice's Civil
Rights Division, which oversees the congressional redistricting process. He resigned from
this position on November 14,1996. U.S. Civil Rights Aide Resigning, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15,
1996, at N8.
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (Shaw II).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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Questions of race and voting rights highlight the differences in
the views of the Supreme Court and the Justice Department, and
place issues of equal protection, statutory affirmative duty, and
federalism squarely against one another. This struggle began after
the Court's decision in Baker v. Carr' established the authority of
federal courts to review state legislative decisions involving
apportionment. Since that decision, the Supreme Court has
encountered numerous voting rights claims brought by racial
minorities under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act. In addition, a relatively new development is racial
gerrymandering claims brought against states that have enacted
redistricting plans benefiting minority groups.7 Suddenly, parties and
attorneys that had previously brought these claims now find
themselves defending against them. The prospect of the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Congressional Black Caucus
intervening in such actions to defend state voting districts would
have been inconceivable in 1965, but in fact occurred in Shaw 1.8
This Comment traces the evolution of redistricting
jurisprudence, analyzes the current position of the Court, and
identifies possible future trends. In particular, the Comment
considers the potential effect of these trends on North Carolina as it
redraws its congressional districts for the third time this decade. The
Comment begins with an introduction to the factors motivating the
creation of the Voting Rights Act, the Act's subsequent amendment,
and its relevant provisions.9 Then, the Comment presents an
overview of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act in the context of congressional districting." The Comment
addresses in detail the most recent Supreme Court proclamations in
this area, Shaw II and Vera." In its analysis, the Comment considers
how the position taken in these recent opinions increases the conflict
between federal courts and states' rights. 2 The Comment also
considers the opinions' effect on a state's ability to defend against
6. 369 U.s. 186 (1962).
7. See, e.g., Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1948; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1899; Miller v. Johnson,
115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483-85 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634-37 (1993) (Shaw 1).
8. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in Support of Appellees at 1-2, Shaw II (No. 94-
923) 1995 WL 702821; Brief of the Congressional Black Caucus as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 1-2, Shaw II (No. 94-923) 1995 WL 702802.
9. See infra notes 16-58 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 59-114 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 115-92 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
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claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause by showing that
the Voting Rights Act required the state's redistricting plan.' Next,
the Comment reviews Justice O'Connor's concurrence to her own
plurality opinion in Vera, and analyzes the concurrence as a
proposed set of guidelines for determining what qualifies as a
constitutional plan. ' Finally, the Comment discusses future trends in
congressional districting.' The Comment contains two Appendices
applying congressional redistricting principles in North Carolina.
Appendix A presents a congressional plan that the author created in
an attempt to comply with the competing guidelines. Appendix B
analyzes the North Carolina General Assembly's plan created after
Shaw II, and compares the two plans.
The heart of Shaw 11 and Vera is the conflict among members of
the Court over legislative redistricting and the Court's increasing
control over a traditional state function. This area of law includes
both separation-of-powers and federalism issues. The United States
Constitution clearly grants state legislatures the primary
responsibility for establishing guidelines for congressional elections.16
This clear delineation has been breached by the Supreme Court in
cases where state processes have conflicted with other constitutional
provisions, but the basic responsibility for drawing districts has
always remained with the states.' Indeed, the traditional
redistricting principles recognized by the Court are modeled after the
typical factors and considerations used by the states in the districting
process."8 The Supreme Court has held that traditional factors, such
13. See infra notes 214-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 271-303 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 304-69 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature."); id. § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof .... ).
17. The vote dilution cases are the most famous departure from traditional principles
of federalism, and the entrance of the Court into this area was questioned by some of the
Justices themselves. See generally Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963) (holding
that a representative form of government requires votes to have equal value and
establishing the principle of one person, one vote); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-10
(1962) (holding that vote dilution claims are justiciable). In its rulings, however, the Court
has never acted to remove the redistricting process from state legislatures; rather, it has
issued various standards under which legislative action may be presumed to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1999 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing
the historical deference to state legislatures).
18. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1952-54.
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as compactness, preserving communities of interest, incumbency
protection, and adherence to political boundaries, do not conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment."' These redistricting principles
recognize the idea that voting is not simply a meaningful exercise to
the individual. Rather, for voting to have any true power, an
individual's vote must have the possibility of being combined with
the votes of similarly minded citizens to ensure a real opportunity to
elect that voter's candidate of choice."0
Shaw II and Vera are the most recent attempts to address the
tension between the Voting Rights Act of 19651 (as amended in
1982) and the Fourteenth' and Fifteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Prior to enactment of the Voting Rights
Act, many states did not submit willingly to the principles of equality
embodied in these amendments, and used facially neutral but
discriminatory voting criteria, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, white
primaries, and "grandfather" clauses, to bar minorities from voting. 4
19. See id. at 1999 (Souter, 3., dissenting) ("[W]e have seen [traditional districting
principles] as entirely consistent with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments'
demands."); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973) (finding that the legislative policy
of preserving incumbents' constituencies was not unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 578 (1964) (noting that states may maintain political subdivisions and provide for
compact and contiguous districts).
20. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1999 n.3 (Souter, I., dissenting). Justice Souter was very
concerned that the injury being remedied had not been articulated clearly. See id. at 2001-
03 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, the generalized determination of whether a group has
been treated properly in the legislative process, instead of an individualized claim of vote
dilution, seems an anathema to Fourteenth Amendment claims, which rely on the premise
that an action places burdens on some but not all. See id at 2001-02 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). For a more extensive discussion of Justice Souter's concerns, see infra notes
198-200, 205-17 and accompanying text.
21. Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to
1973bb-1 (1994)).
22. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person withinits jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
23. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. amend. XV, § 1.
24. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MiNORITY VOTING 11-13 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992). The poll tax was used extensively in the South and was particularly oppressive
in Alabama, Mssissippi, and Virginia, where its assessment was cumulative. See ia at 13.
literacy tests, however, provided the most effective barrier to black voting because even if
administered fairly, blacks were hindered due to the inadequate education provided under
Jim Crow systems. When administered unfairly, the tests benefited illiterate white voters.
See id.
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In addition, racial gerrymandering arose as a means of diluting
minority votes.' Whenever courts struck down these discriminatory
techniques, states replaced them with new discriminatory rules and
methods, which then had to be challenged in court. Because of the
time necessary to adjudicate a claim, discriminatory rules continued
to exist while the courts played catch-up. 6 These methods of limiting
the minority vote were so effective that by the 1960s the registration
rate of eligible black voters was as much as fifty percent lower than
that of white voters.' Encouraged by President Lyndon Johnson,
Congress reacted to this dire situation by enacting the Voting Rights
Act." The statute voided all current discriminatory rules,29 required
areas with a history of voting discrimination to have any future rules
approved before they could be implemented,"0 and established the
requirement of equal protection for voting rights.3
The primary substantive provisions of the Voting Rights Act are
found in Sections Two and Five. Section Two (§ 2), as passed in
1965, read: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."
32
25. Racial gerrymandering is the carving of districts so as to diminish the voting power
of minority groups. See id at 24. Alternatively, it may occur through the packing together
of almost all the minority voters into one district, limiting their influence outside the area.
See iU. at 23 n.56. To be effective, gerrymandering and other methods of vote dilution
through the structuring of districts rely on racially polarized voting by both minority and
nonminority voters. See id. at 23.
26. See id. at 13.
27. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 640 (referring to the effects of discrimination outlined in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966)). Congress enacted weak voting
rights acts in 1957, 1960, and 1964, which did little to improve the situation. See Civil
Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971,1995 (1994)); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L No. 86-449,74 Stat. 86 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1074, 1509, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1974 to 1974e (1994)); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to
2000h-6 (1994)); Davidson, supra note 24, at 13.
28. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)); Davidson, supra note 24, at 17.
The State raised the relevant application of § 2 and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Shaw
1. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
29. See 42U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1).
30. See i § 1973c. Generally referred to as § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, this
provision is discussed more fully infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
32. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (amended
1982).
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The Supreme Court's 1973 decision in White v. Regestei93 extended
§ 2's application to cases of discriminatory results, as well as
discriminatory intent.' However, the Court effectively overruled
White seven years later in City of Mobile v. Bolden.5 While Bolden
did not directly overrule White,36 by articulating the issue in White to
be "whether the multi-member districts [were] being used invidiously
to ... minimize the voting strength of racial groups,"37 it held that
purposeful vote dilution was required for a vote dilution claim."
Bolden immediately weakened the effectiveness of § 2 litigation.39
By finding that § 2 went no further than the Fifteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court required proof that an election method was
created for the purpose of discrimination.0 In response, Congress
added a "results" standard to the statute in 1982, thus establishing
that "proof of discriminatory results, rather than intent, was
sufficient to substantiate a claim of dilution." 1 Congress, however,
was deeply divided over this amendment, particularly over whether
such a change would require racial quotas.42 Ultimately, Congress
mitigated the change with the following phrase: "Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population."3
Section Five (§ 5) of the Voting Rights Act provides for
33. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
34. See L at 767, 769-70 (holding that the impact of an electoral system may
constitute invidious discrimination).
35. 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980) (holding that the intent to discriminate must be shown in
order to establish a claim of vote dilution).
36. See id. at 68-69.
37. Id. at 69 (citations omitted).
38. See id.
39. See Anita S. Hodgkiss, Shaw v. Hunt: 1996 and Beyond, Update on Voting Rights
Law 3 (Sept. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Reviev).
40. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61. This change made it almost impossible for plaintiffs
to succeed. See Hodgkiss, supra note 39, at 3.
41. Davidson, supra note 24, at 39. The body of § 2 now states:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
42. See Davidson, supra note 24, at 39-40.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Commonly known as the "Dole Compromise," this was an
agreement formulated primarily by Senators Edward Kennedy, a Democrat from
Massachusetts, and Robert Dole, a Republican from Kansas. See Davidson, supra note 24,
at 40 & n.104.
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
preclearance of any changes in voting plans or practices."
Preclearance is a procedural safeguard against the violations
identified in the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 requires that any state
or political subdivision determined to have previously engaged in
racial vote dilution practices must submit any proposed changes in
voting qualifications, standards, or practices to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaratory
judgment "that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."5
Alternatively, the state may present the proposed change to the
Attorney General, allowing the Attorney General to make this same
evaluation.'" The Attorney General then has sixty days to enter an
objection to the proposed plan.47 Consistently, states have sought
preclearance from the Attorney General's office. As a result, the
Attorney General's office has developed expertise in this area.'
Section 5 preclearance applies to areas that used prejudicial voting
tests or had registered less than fifty percent of voting-age residents
on November 1, 1964.'9 Subsequent Court decisions also have used
§ 5 to prevent retrogression in minority representation.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the interrelation of § 2




48. All of the recent Supreme Court cases were submitted to the Attorney General's
office rather than to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941; Shaw It, 116 S. Ct. 1894; Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
The fact that states such as North Carolina and Georgia redrafted their plans rather than
challenge the Attorney General's denial of preclearance indicates states' preference for
working with the Attorney General's office on this issue. See Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1899
(indicating that redrawing of districts followed objection letter from Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84 (same).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). This provision also provided for review in 1968 and
1970. See id Any additional states or political subdivisions found at that time to satisfy
these criteria were also subject to review. See iU. A determination that an area requires
preclearance is not reviewable by any court. See id.
50. See, e.g., Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (determining that the
purpose of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is to ensure that a change in voting procedure does
not lead to a retrogression in the effective participation of racial minorities in the electoral
process). Retrogression means a decline in minority representation determined by
comparing what currently exists to what is likely to exist under a modified plan. See
BERNARD GROFMAN Er AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR
VOTING EQUA.IT 26 (1992). The Court's interpretation of retrogression,
nonretrogression, and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is discussed more fully infra notes 109-
14,219-41 and accompanying text.
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and § 5 requirements in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.51
Noting that each section addressed different concerns, the Court
rejected the position that a violation of § 2 is reason to deny § 5
preclearance.52 Observing that § 5 was a reaction to the history of
local circumvention of legislative and judicial rulings in certain areas,
the Court recognized that § 5's requirements are specific to certain
jurisdictions.53 Section 5 works to protect against retrogression by
comparing proposed voting changes to the existing plan, whereas § 2
applies to all jurisdictions and is designed to end voting practices that
weaken minority voting strength.-4 Determination of a § 2 claim
requires comparing a challenged plan to an ideal, undiluted voting
plan.' This standard is higher than the § 5 standard, and a majority
of the Court declined to apply it, finding such a position would
contradict twenty years of judicial interpretation of § 5 According
to the Court, § 5 is designed only to prevent retrogression, not to
implement the § 2 ideal plan.7 All of the Justices, with the exception
of Justices Stevens and Souter, supported this portion of the
opinion."
Thornburg v. Gingles,59 a case originating in North Carolina,
provided the first post-1982 review of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.60
51. 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997). Bossier Parish School Board involved the school board's
application for approval of changes to its members' voting districts. After the 1990
Census, the Board redrew its members' districts "to equalize the population distribution."
Id. at 1495. The Board initially rejected a plan containing no majority-minority districts
that the Attorney General had precleared. See id at 1496. The parties stipulated that the
plan was not "retrogressive" because no majority black districts existed under the status
quo. See id The Board then considered an NAACP plan containing two majority black
districts, but rejected it, and adopted the first plan instead. See id However, the Attorney
General decided not to approve the first plan after all, based on the existence of the
NAACP plan and the fact that the first plan violated § 2. See id. The Board sought district
court preclearance, and the Supreme Court ruled that the plan should be precleared under
§ 5 since it was not retrogressive, even though it may violate § 2. See id
52. See id at 1497. The Court determined that the standards for § 2 and § 5 are
different. Section 5 requires that any change in voting laws be precleared to prevent
retrogression. See id This standard is lower than § 2's standard. See id. Even if a change
violates § 2, it should be precleared under § 5 as long as it is not retrogressive. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1497-98.
55. See id. at 1498.
56. See id.
57. See id
58. See id. at 1503 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1505 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Souter).
59. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
60. See id. at 34. Many of the major amendments to § 2 occurred in 1982. See supra
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In Gingles, the plaintiffs contended that the multi-member districts
used for North Carolina's legislative elections impaired the
opportunity of black voters to participate in the political process.6'
In its analysis of this claim, the lower court considered the Senate
Judiciary Committee Majority Report on § 2 of the bill containing
the Voting Rights Act amendment.62 This report established that the
amendment was intended to counteract the Supreme Court's ruling
in Bolden.6 The report also identified numerous "typical factors"
that courts should consider when applying a "results test" to § 2
claims. These factors include: the "extent of any history of official
discrimination"; the degree of "racially polarized" voting present; the
use of large multi-member electoral districts, "majority vote
requirements," or anti-"single-shot" provisions;64 denial of access to
candidate slating; the burden of discrimination already placed on the
minority population due to "education, employment and health";
racial overtones of political campaigns; and the past success of
minority candidates.' The district court used these provisions as a
checklist in applying a "totality of the circumstances" test. The
Supreme Court affirmed that this approach was a correct
interpretation of Congress's intent in amending the statute, but
noted that the factors are balanced by the circumstances in which a
notes 32-43 and accompanying text. Most importantly, Congress adopted a "results"
standard so that proof of discriminatory results is sufficient to bring a § 2 claim. See
Davidson, supra note 24, at 39.
61. See id. at 35. As the name implies, multi-member districts are districts in which
the voting population elects multiple representatives instead of being subdivided into
smaller districts electing individual representatives. For example, voters in a multi-
member district will elect five representatives instead of five districts each electing a
single representative. When a minority group could be a majority in a single district, but a
multi-member district is used instead, the minority group's ability to control the election of
one representative may be lessened. See id. at 49.
62. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-38; see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07 (analyzing the effect of § 2 and the factors a
plaintiff could use to show a violation of § 2).
63. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 n.112, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206.
64. "Single-shot" voting occurs when a voter may vote for several candidates on a
ballot but chooses to vote for only one. See Davidson, supra note 24, at 25 n.63. Under
single-shot voting, the minority population could have some success by voting, as a group,
only for the minority-choice candidate. See id. This strategy concentrates the minority
vote and diffuses the white vote among the remaining candidates, thereby ensuring that
the minority choice candidate would be elected to one of the positions. See id. To counter
this success, some districts enacted full-slate and numbered-place legislation, which either
barred or limited the effectiveness of this "single-shot" approach to the ballot. See id. at
23.
65. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37 (citations omitted); see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-
29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07 (describing these factors).
1997] 2159
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§ 2 violation may be proven."'
The Court found that many factors may be relevant to the
inability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice,
but a certain intersection of factors must be present for actionable
submergence of minority voting power. 7 Therefore, the Court
established three necessary preconditions before minority voters will
be deemed impaired by multi-member districts:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority, in a .single-member district....
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is
politically cohesive.... Third, the minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate."
Unless these preconditions are satisfied, the mere use of multi-
member districts cannot be considered to prevent the electoral
success that the minority group might be able to achieve under a
different districting scheme.6
In the first appearance of Shaw before the Supreme Court, Shaw
v. Reno (Shaw I),'0 the Court recognized a new claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court's opinion, authored by Justice
O'Connor, noted that despite the ideal of a "color-blind"
Constitution, the Supreme Court had never held that "race-conscious
state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances.""
However, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause may be found
when a redistricting plan is "so extremely irregular on its face that it
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for
purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification."' The
66. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 50-51 (emphasis added).
69. The Supreme Court extended these preconditions to single-member districts in
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993). Though multi-member voting districts
historically were used to dilute minority voting strength, if the Gingles preconditions were
not applied to single-member districts, the threshold for establishing injury would be
higher with a multi-member than with a single-member district. See id. at 40. This result
seemed counterintuitive to the Court's purpose of eliminating vote dilution; therefore, the
Gingles preconditions are now applicable to all voting districts. See id. at 40-42.
70. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw 1).
71. Id. at 642.
72. Id.
[Vol. 752160
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Court acknowledged that determining whether race influenced
redistricting is somewhat more difficult than with other legislative
actions because the state would always be aware of race.3 However,
the Court found that such race consciousness does not inevitably
lead to racial discrimination.74  States emphasizing traditional
districting principles, such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions, could use these objective factors as a defense
to claims of racial gerrymandering In short, when dealing with
reapportionment, "appearances do matter. 76 Thus, the majority of
the Court rejected the idea that members of a racial minority may be
grouped together regardless of factors such as age, economic status,
and location, asserting that grouping in such a manner was as
dangerous as racial stereotyping." However, the decision did not
eliminate racial redistricting. Racial redistricting was allowable as
long as the state had a compelling interest for it and the district was
narrowly tailored.78  Narrow tailoring required that a state do no
more than absolutely necessary to provide for equal representation
of minority interests.7
73. See id. at 646.
74. See id. (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), in which the Court found
that reapportionment plans concentrating a community of minority individuals may reflect
legitimate purposes).
75. See id. at 647.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 647-48.
78. See id. at 658. These requirements form strict scrutiny under equal protection
review. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995) (dispelling
the idea that strict scrutiny is necessarily fatal by noting that in 1987 a unanimous Court
upheld a narrowly tailored race-based remedy in United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987)). This is the most stringent type of equal protection analysis, and, although not
insurmountable, challenged statutes and applications rarely survive it. See id.; accord
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
(defining strict scrutiny as "scrutiny that is strict in theory, but fatal in fact"). Developed
in the area of racial discrimination, it generally is applied to express racial classifications
or actions having a discriminatory effect. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)
(holding that a neutral law making interracial marriage illegal was unconstitutional
because it lacked a compelling reason); Korematsa v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218
(1944) (finding that the incarceration of citizens of Japanese ancestry was justified by a
compelling reason); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1879) (creating strict
scrutiny review for an equal protection violation in jury service). In his famous footnote,
Justice Stone instilled the idea that legislation impinging upon some constitutional rights
may be subject to a higher standard of judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Basically, under Justice Stone's theory, when the
group discriminated against is so politically weak that it is unable to influence the
legislature to protect its rights and thus relies on the courts for relief, the group should be
given greater protection. See id.
79. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643-44 (providing a history of the application of narrow
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Following Shaw I, state and local jurisdictions faced with the
task of drawing districts found themselves in a bind. While Shaw I
permitted them to take only limited action to improve effective
minority voting strength, the Voting Rights Act required more
aggressive measures. Although the Justice Department has
interpreted the Voting Rights Act as requiring a maximization of
majority-minority districts wherever possible,' if the application of
this principle results in too many irregularly shaped or non-compact
districts, the jurisdiction could be faced with a racial gerrymandering
suit based on the Fourteenth Amendment."' Alternatively, a
jurisdiction could refuse to maximize majority-minority districts and
be denied § 5 preclearance by the Department of Justice, which
could lead to a § 2 vote dilution suit.8
The Court directly reviewed the Justice Department's
maximization principle in Johnson v. DeGrandy." This § 2 action
arose from a Florida redistricting plan for state representatives that
failed to maximize majority-minority districts, even though
minorities were able to form voting coalitions and elect minority
candidates in proportion to their percentage of the population.' The
Court recognized that the district court defined vote dilution under
§ 2 as any failure to maximize minority representation.' However,
tailoring in race discrimination); ia at 654-55 (noting that previous cases have not
recognized § 5 as granting broad authority to engage in racial gerrymandering to avoid
retrogression). The stringent application of narrow tailoring in the voting rights context
has been better defined in the Court's later opinions, particularly Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2490-93 (1995). See infra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
80. Deval Patrick, speaking for the Justice Department, denied that there was a policy
of maximization, but the Court has interpreted differently the Attorney General's
objections to submitted plans from several states. See Remarks of Deval Patrick, supra
note 1; see also infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis of
this maximization policy).
81. See Benjamin E. Griffith, Race-Predominant Redistricting After Shaw v. Humt and
Bush v. Vera: Consigned to the Dustbin of History? 4-5, Presentation at the National
Conference of State Legislatures Reapportionment Task Force (July 27, 1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
82. See id. at 5.
83. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
84. Proportionality is viewed in this context as the relation between the number of
minority voting districts and minority members' percentage of the population. It does not
refer to the success of minority candidates, but to the political power of minority voters.
The proportional representation clause of § 2, as codified and amended, states that
"nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994). Thus,
§ 2 provides for equal opportunity, not equal success. See DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1014
n1l.
85. See DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1016.
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the Court objected to this reading as contrary to the legislative intent
merely to provide a means to increase minority representation, not
to increase it to the point that it was over representative of the
minority population. According to the Court, "[flailure to maximize
cannot be the measure of § 2.,86
The DeGrandy Court also found each of the three Gingles
factors to be present, but held that a mechanical application of these
factors was not sufficient to sustain a claimY While the Gingles
factors are necessary preconditions, their mere existence is not
86. Id. at 1017. It is particularly significant that Justice Souter delivered the opinion
of the Court, and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part, stating: "I
agree with the Court that the District Court's maximization theory was an erroneous
application of § 2." Id. at 1026 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Thus, even the Justices who would uphold the Shaw district do not read § 2 to
require maximization. Cf. Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1922 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (" '[A] state
legislature's primary jurisdiction for legislative apportionment and redistricting must
include the right . . ., free of judicial rejection, to implement state policies that may fail to
remedy to the fullest extent possible the voting rights violations originally found."'
(quoting Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 382 (1984))). Therefore, while some
Justices may recognize and favor majority-minority districts, a basic policy of creating
them wherever possible is not advocated by the Court. Though some critics of majority-
minority districts have claimed that their creation will result in an abandonment of
traditional districts, the Court's position indicates that such a prediction is unrealistic. See
Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the
Emperor's Clothes, in AFFRMATsVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION-SHAW V. RENO
AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS 223 passim (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997)
[hereinafter AFFRMATIVE ACTION] (arguing that proportional representation is
necessary for political fairness); Lynett Henderson, Lost in the Woods: The Supreme
Cour4 Race, and the Quest for Justice in Congressional Reapportionment, 73 DENV. U. L
REV. 201, 232-35 (1995) (finding a different electoral system necessary to resolve the
political impasse and suggesting possible alternatives); Conference, The Supreme Court,
Racial Politics, and the Right to Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights
Act, 44 AM. U. L REV. 1, 59 (1994) [hereinafter Conference] (raising the argument that
majority-minority districts lead to representatives from surrounding districts who are less
responsive to minority concerns).
In application, maximization has extremely partisan effects. Minority voters are "the
most reliable of Democratic voters." Conference, supra, at 56. When minorities are
grouped together in a district, the district becomes a Democratic stronghold; however, the
surrounding districts are weakened for Democratic candidates by the removal of these
voters. The surrounding districts then tend to vote Republican. See id In 1991-92, when
the cases in this line of precedent were in the process of receiving preclearance, President
George Bush, a Republican, was in office. Under his presidency, the Attorney General's
office seems to have pursued this maximization policy. See id at 15, 56. Historically,
grouping minorities into districts with "super-majority-minorities" has been considered a
form of racial gerrymandering known as "packing." See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into
the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43
EMORY L.J. 1519, 1525 n.31 (1994). While these districts do not contain "super-
majorities," they have been analogized to this form of gerrymandering. See id. at 1557.
87. See DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1006-07.
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determinative of a § 2 violation--a court must also consider the
"totality of the circumstances."'  Originally, the Supreme Court
developed the Gingles test as a structural guideline to examine these
circumstances.' In DeGrandy, the Court reiterated its position that a
general review also must be undertaken and that proportionality is
one of the relevant factors.9' However, the Court noted that
proportionality is not dispositive' In a section particularly
illustrative of the Court's goal of colorblindness, the opinion
reminded lower courts that while majority-minority districts are
necessary remedial devices in some circumstances, they are premised
on "'politics of second best.' "" According to the Court, the goal of
the Voting Rights Act-to "hasten the waning of racism in American
politics"--would be better served if minority-choice candidates were
elected without maximization districts, but rather through the efforts
of minority voters "to pull, haul, and trade to find common political
ground. '
At the end of its 1995 Term, the Supreme Court handed down
Miller v. Johnson, clarifying its position in Shaw L Miller grew out
of the difficulties that Georgia encountered in obtaining § 5
preclearance of its redistricting plan. The Supreme Court sharply
criticized the predominant role that race played in drawing the final
plan." The interaction between the Justice Department and the
Georgia legislature illustrated the type of interaction between states
and the Justice Department that the Court found particularly
reprehensible. After a special legislative session in October of 1991,
88. See id. at 1011-13.
89. Id. at 1009-10.
90. See id. at 1010-11.
91. See id. at 1013-14.
92. See id at 1014, 1020-21. The Court declined to establish proportionality as a safe
harbor for states because of the perverse incentive to create majority-minority districts
where they were unnecessary for equal access and opportunity to participate in the
political process. See id. at 1019-20.
93. Id. at 1020 (quoting GROFMAN Er AL, supra note 50, at 136). The premise is that
by applying a race-conscious calculus, the ultimate goal of equality is still not being
reached fully. However, the authors argue that this is a "necessary evil in a color-
conscious world" and thus still preferable to the alternative of no minority representation
from largely white districts. See GROFMAN ETAL., supra note 50, at 136.
94. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1020.
95. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
96. See generally Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86 (emphasizing the district court's sharp
criticism of the Justice Department's partisan influence and finding the grouping of voters




Georgia sought Justice Department preclearance of a plan increasing
the number of majority-black districts in the state from one to two.'
The Attorney General refused preclearance, noting in the objection
letter that Georgia had created only two, instead of three, majority-
black districts, and that certain African-American populations were
not placed in such a district."
The legislature then redrew the districts, assigning the black
population in central Georgia to a majority-black district and
increasing the percentage of minority voters in three districts.' Once
again, the Justice Department denied preclearance. Relying on an
alternative plan drafted by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), which contained three majority-black districts, the
Attorney General's letter stated that the legislature "failed to explain
adequately" its failure to create the third majority-minority district.00
After being chastised by the Justice Department twice, the legislature
created a redistricting plan that closely resembled the ACLU's plan,
nicknamed "max-black." 101  Although this plan received
preclearance,"° it created a district connecting black neighborhoods
of Atlanta with poor, predominantly black areas of coastal Chatham
County, "260 miles apart in distance and worlds apart in culture."'"
Georgia residents challenged the plan, and the Court recognized
their Equal Protection claim under the terms of Shaw I-
[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in
Shaw is that the State has used race as a basis for separating
voters into districts. Just as the State may not... segregate
citizens on the basis of race in its public parks ... so did we
recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race."
In addition to applying Shaw I to the Equal Protection claim in
Miller, the Court clarified several aspects of the Shaw I opinion.
First, the Court stated that although bizarre shape is often indicative
97. See id. at 2483.
98. See id. at 2483-84.
99. See id. at 2484.
100. Id (citations omitted).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. The district has been described in various colorful ways, including "Sherman's
march to the sea." Theo Uppman, Jr., Editorial, BALTIMORE SUN, July 10, 1995, at A6.
While the borders of this district are not as tortured as those in the questioned North
Carolina or Texas districts, the broad sweep of the district and its mix of urban/rural and
various socioeconomic classes of minorities drew the attention resulting in this suit.
104. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2485-86 (citations omitted).
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of racially gerrymandered districts, a showing of bizarre shape is not
a threshold requirement for the claim." Second, the plaintiff must
prove that race was the predominant factor in the legislature's
decision by showing that traditional, race-neutral districting
principles were subordinated to race.'6 Third, if a state does show a
compelling interest for racial redistricting, a "strong basis in evidence
of the harm being remedied" is necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny,"
the "most rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review."'1°
The Miller Court again rejected the Attorney General's
maximization requirement for preclearance under the Voting Rights
Act.'" In previous decisions, the Court interpreted § 5 as ensuring
that changes in voting procedure do not lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities in their effective involvement in the
electoral process.11 District plans increasing the number of majority-
minority districts are termed "'ameliorative.' .... Since, by this
definition, the originally proposed Georgia plan was ameliorative,
the Court found that it was not objectionable on the grounds that it
was not ameliorative enough.' Thus, a plan showing any
improvement in minority voting opportunity will not violate § 5
unless the plan is so racially discriminatory as to violate the
Constitution." Therefore, the Attorney General's refusal to
preclear these plans, and the Georgia legislature's fear of a § 5 claim,
were both unfounded. 4
Against this backdrop of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court considered two recent Voting Rights Act claims in
Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw I1)" and Bush v. Vera."' Shaw 11 arose in
North Carolina. Following the 1990 census, North Carolina's
congressional delegation was increased from eleven to twelve
105. See id. at 2488.
106. See id. Principles generally recognized as race-neutral include compactness,
contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and communities of shared interests. See
Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1952-54; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2488.
107. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2491.
108. Id. at 2490.
109. See id. at 2491-93.
110. See id. at 2493 (discussing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).




115. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
116. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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members. " Originally, members of the North Carolina General
Assembly were excited by the prospect of an additional North
Carolina representative in Congress."' However, the problems and
expenses that the change caused presumably eroded much of this
delight. The legislature initially adopted a redistricting plan that
included one minority district in the northeast section of the state."
The plan was submitted to the Attorney General of the United
States for preclearance pursuant to § 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act.120  The Justice Department, through the Assistant Attorney
General, denied preclearance, noting that the state "'failed to give
effect to black and Native American voting strength in the south-
central to southeastern part of the state.' ,, In response, the
legislature adopted a second redistricting plan that included two
majority-minority districts: the First and the Twelfth." '  The
Attorney General precleared the plan, even though the new districts
were bizarrely shaped, and even thought District 12 was centered in
the Piedmont or north-central area of the state rather than the south-
central area that the Attorney General had identified as
problematic."z
The descriptions of these two majority-minority districts have
often been repeated, and their boundaries drew considerable
attention from the Court:
District il is somewhat hook shaped. Centered in the
117. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1899.
118. See North Carolina News Briefs, UPI BC Cycle (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 25, 1986,
available in LEXIS, News library, Arcnews File.
119. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1899.
120. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General's
role in the preclearance process under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
121. Shaw LT, 116 S. Ct. at 1899 (citations omitted) (quoting Letter from Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights). Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties
require judicial preclearance for any changes in voting districts pursuant to § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993) (Shaw 1). Because all
congressional districts must be as equal in population as practicable, see infra note 362, any
changes in one boundary line require modifications in the boundary lines of other districts,
effectively requiring the entire state plan to be precleared.
122. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1899.
123. See id. The allegation is that the Justice Department was willing to accept any
plan with two majority-minority districts, regardless of where they were located, due to the
Justice Department's maximization policy. Interview with Tom Farr of Maupin, Taylor,
Ellis & Adams, P.A., in Raleigh, N.C. (Sept. 27, 1996); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2484, 2492 (1995) (noting that the Attorney General refused to preclear several
Georgia plans with two majority-minority districts because the legislature failed to explain
why three districts were not created); supra note 86 (explaining and examining the
political effect of maximization).
1997] 2167
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it
tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it
reaches far into the southern-most part of the State near the
South Carolina border ....
... District 121] is even more unusually shaped. It is
approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no
wider than the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion
through tobacco country, financial centers, and
manufacturing areas "until it gobbles in enough enclaves of
black neighborhoods. ' 'u 4
Five North Carolinians initiated the Shaw suit against several
state officials in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina." A three-judge panel of the district
court dismissed the complaint. 1 6 The plaintiffs appealed directly to
the Supreme Court,' as provided for in the Voting Rights Act."
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and
instructed the district court to determine on remand if there was
evidence of racial gerrymandering in the drawing of the
congressional districts,9 and if so, whether it met the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate that "state legislation that expressly
distinguishes among citizens because of their race ... be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest."" The
district court determined that race was a predominant consideration
124. Shaw , 509 U.S. at 635-36 (quoting Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 476 (E.D.N.C.
1992) (Voorhees, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw 1)). Commentary on the districts' shapes may be even
more indicative of the districts' impression on observers. District I has been described as
looking like a "'bug splattered on a windshield.'" Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 635 (quoting
Editorial, Political Pornography-H, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 4,1992, at A14 (describing District 1
in the original plan that was denied preclearance, although District I remained
substantially the same in the approved plan)). In reference to District 12, one state
legislator was quoted as saying, "'[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors
open, you'd kill most of the people in the district."' Joan Biskupic, NC Case to Pose Test
of Racial Redisticting; White Voters Challenge Black-Majority Map, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,
1993, at A4 (quoting unnamed North Carolina state legislator), quoted in Shaw 1, 509 U.S.
at 636.
125. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 463-64 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nor. Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw ). Originally, the action was also against the
Attorney General of the United States and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Rights Division, but the District Court granted these defendants' motion to dismiss in
Shaw v. Barr, id. at 467, and the decision was not appealed.
126. See id. at 473.
127. See Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 639.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (1994).
129. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 658.
130. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
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in the state's redistricting plan, but that District 12 was constitutional
because it was "narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling
interests in complying with §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act."''
Once again the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court."
In this second appeal, known as "Shaw II," the Court applied a
two-step process to determine whether District 12 was
constitutional.' In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Court noted that while strict scrutiny is the standard of review for
racial equal protection claims, "[a]pplying traditional ... principles
in the voting-rights context is 'a most delicate task.' ""' Unlike other
areas where the use and consideration of race in legislative action is
constitutionally suspect, state legislatures invariably are aware of
race when drawing districts, if only because it is one of the pieces of
information included in census material."' Thus, in the voting rights
context, mere awareness of race is not the problem. The
"constitutional wrong occurs when race becomes the 'dominant and
controlling' consideration. '' .. The Court focused on statements
made by state officials that their objective was to create two majority-
minority districts in order to receive preclearance from the Attorney
General.' Based on these statements, the Court upheld the district
court's finding that race was a predominant consideration in the
drawing of districts."8
While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment generally prohibits racial classifications,"9  such
classifications may be acceptable when the state is pursuing a
compelling state interest.' In defense of District 12, North Carolina
offered three compelling interests: "to eradicate the effects of past
and present discrimination; to comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act; and to comply with § 2 of that Act."' 4' The Court found the
state's interest in eradicating past discrimination unacceptable, but
131. Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1899-1900.
132. See id.
133. The Court applied the standard two-part test for strict scrutiny it has developed in
cases involving racial discrimination: (1) Is there a compelling state interest? (2) Is the
legislation narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest? See id. at 1902.
134. Id. at 1900 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995)).
135. See id.
136. Id. (quoting Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486).
137. See id. at 1901.
138. See id.
139. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.




limited its holding to the instant case, noting that this general interest
could be a legitimate defense in the future. 2 For eradication of past
and present discrimination to be a compelling state interest, the
discrimination must be in a specific area, not generalized to the state,
and there must be a "strong basis in evidence" for the remedial
action taken.' The Court held that North Carolina failed to show
that at the time the districts were drawn, evidence of discriminatory
practices existed. Thus, such practices could not have been the
prevailing concern of the General Assembly.'"
The Court next considered whether compliance with the Voting
Rights Act could be a compelling state interest, but avoided reaching
a specific decision on that point.'45 Rather, the Court held that the
Justice Department and the North Carolina General Assembly
misinterpreted § 5 of the Voting Rights Act 46 as requiring a
maximization of majority-minority districts, rather than non-
retrogression. 14 The Court stated that its holding in Miller v.
Johnson,'" the Georgia voting rights case, precluded this reading of
§ 5. 49 Thus, the Court rejected North Carolina's argument that the
drawing of the second majority-minority district was required by the
Justice Department's interpretation of § S."°
Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that compliance with
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act" could be a compelling state interest,
142. See id.
143. Id. at 1902-03 (citations omitted).
144. See &L at 1903. While the State did produce reports of the relation between race
and politics, the fact that these reports were dated March 1994 while the original districts
were drawn in 1991 indicated a lack of credibility to the Court. See U For a discussion of
the use of these reports for post hoc rationalization, see infra note 264.
145. See Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1903, 1905.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (requiring "that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color").
147. See Shaw 1, 116 S. Ct. at 1903-04. The Court's interpretation of non-retrogression
and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act is discussed more fully supra notes 109-14 and
accompanying text.
148. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
149. See Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1903-04.
150. See id.
151. Section 2, as codified and amended, states: "No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a);
see also supra notes 32-43 (providing an overview of the statutory and judicial interplay on
§ 2); infra notes 242-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's consideration of the
§ 2 defense).
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the Court found that the creation of the second majority-minority
district did not survive strict scrutiny because that district was not
narrowly tailored to remedy past racial discrimination.' The Court
specifically rejected North Carolina's argument that a state may
create a remedial district anywhere in the state once a § 2 violation
has been established.' The Court recognized that prior decisions
had not specified how closely correlated the ends and means must be
for an action to be narrowly tailored. The Court therefore
determined that the legislative action should "substantially address,
if not achieve, the avowed purpose."' 4 Since the remedy was not
applied to those suffering the injury-those in the south-central area
of North Carolina--the Court determined that it did not satisfy the
requirement."' Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court held that
District 12 was unconstitutional."6 The majority emphasized that the
Equal Protection Clause applies to individual citizens, not to a
minority group as a class.' Thus, the remedy in a vote dilution
claim must apply to the individual claimants suffering the injury,
such as the minority voters in south-central North Carolina."8
152. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1905.
153. See id. at 1906.
154. Id. at 1905.
155. See id. at 1906. The Court's concern with applying a specific remedy to a specific
injury was particularly evident in the oral argument before the Court. See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Shaw v. Hunt (No. 94-923, 94-924), available in 1995 WL 729891, at *44-
*76. The Justices were concerned that North Carolina had interpreted Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (establishing three preconditions to a cognizable
violation of the Voting Rights Act), to mean that once a violation had been established the
state legislature could create a remedial district anywhere it chose based on principles of
federalism. The Supreme Court was very clear in its statements while questioning the
state's attorney that an overlap is needed between any majority-minority district created
and the area used to satisfy the Gingles criteria. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Shaw v.
Hunt (No. 94-923, 94-924), available in 1995 WL 729891, at *44-*76.
156. This decision applied to only District 12 because the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring a claim with regard to District 1. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1900. In United States v.
Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995), the Supreme Court held that only parties residing in the
challenged district, or those that can demonstrate they personally have been subject to
racial classification, have standing to bring a racial gerrymandering claim. See id. at 2436-
37. Two of the original five plaintiffs in Shaw survived this test, but only with respect to
District 12. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1900.
157. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
158. Vote dilution is a method of reducing the effect of an individual's vote without
actually denying the individual the right to vote. For example, members of a racial
minority may be able to make up the majority of a single-representative district, but if a
multi-representative district is created by including areas lacking racial minorities, the
election results may differ-racial minorities may become submerged in the multi-
representative district and be less able to elect the candidate of their choice. See
GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 50, at 23-26. In 1969, the Supreme Court decided that § 5
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Concurrent with Shaw II, the Supreme Court considered and
issued an opinion in the Texas redistricting case Bush v. Vera.!9 The
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, affirmed a
unanimous district court ruling declaring Texas's redistricting plan
unconstitutional as a racial gerrymander.1" Three districts were
challenged in this appeal: District 30, a new majority-African-
American district in Dallas County; District 29, a new majority-
Hispanic district in Harris County; and District 18, a reconfigured
majority-African-American district interlocking with District 29.161
The legislature's failure to observe traditional districting criteria,
such as compactness,"' its commitment to creating majority-minority
districts," and its manipulation of district lines based on
unprecedentedly detailed racial data ' strongly supported the
application of strict scrutiny. In contrast, the legislature also was
found to have been influenced by non-race factors, particularly
incumbency protection.'6 Thus, the Court recognized that this was a
"mixed motive" case.'" Yet, after a careful review of each of the
questioned districts, the Court determined that strict scrutiny was the
applicable standard of review for each district. 67
precluded vote procedure changes resulting in vote dilution. See Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544,569 (1969); GROFMANETAL, supra note 50, at 30.
159. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
160. See id. at 1951.
161. See id. at 1954-59. Districts 18 and 29 are described as interlocking because they
fit together "like a jigsaw puzzle ... in which it might be impossible to get the pieces
apart." Id. at 1958 (citations omitted). Essentially, the border between these districts is
drawn such that all the Hispanic voters in the area are in District 29 and all the African-
American voters are in District 18. See id. at 1958-59.
162. The district court rejected the appellants' claim that the Texas legislature could
not be charged with a duty to follow traditional districting criteria because adherence to
"'natural geographical boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and conformity to political
subdivisions' "had never been used by Texas prior to this districting. Id. at 1952 (quoting
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1333 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Bush v. Vera,
116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's finding that
the challenged districts were proportionally so much more irregular than previous districts
as to negate this argument. See id.
163. The Texas legislature's application for § 5 preclearance from the Department of
Justice recognized a legislative consensus that the three new districts should "'allow
members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities to elect Congressional
representatives.'" Id. (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1315 (S.D. Tex.
1994), affd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)).
164. See id. Texas's redistricting computer program, REDAPPL included racial data
at the census block level (from the 1990 census), but party registration and past voting
statistics were available only for larger voter tabulation districts. See id. at 1953.
165. See id. at 1954.
166. See d. at 1952.
167. See id. Strict scrutiny is required in redistricting only when race is the
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The Court rejected Texas's argument that District 30,', while
non-compact and irregular in shape, was not a racial gerrymander,69
but an attempt to join communities of interest. 70 As in Shaw II, the
Court rejected this argument largely due to the fact that the Texas
legislature did not consider the information supporting this claim at
the time that redistricting occurred. 7' The Court similarly rejected
the appellants' second argument that incumbency protection led to
political gerrymandering.72  While recognizing precedent for the
position that political gerrymandering is not subject to strict
scrutiny,173 the Court stated that "to the extent that race is used as a
proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict
scrutiny is in operation."' 74  The boundaries of the interlocking
districts, which crossed city limits, local election precincts, and voter
tabulation districts, were found "'unexplainable on grounds other
than ... racial quotas.' 7' Thus, the Court applied strict scrutiny,
rejecting Texas's argument that the legislature considered
incumbency protection and other factors equally with race. 6
Continuing its analysis, the Court held that none of the districts
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'
predominant factor in the legislature's redistricting process. See id.
168. District 30's population is 50% African-American and 17.1% Hispanic. See id. at
1954. Fifty-percent of the district's population is located in a compact central core with
"narrow and bizarrely shaped tentacles" extending to the north and west. Id.
169. See id. at 1955.
170. See id Texas's argument rested on the urban character of the district, as well as
the shared media sources and major transportation lines to Dallas. See id. While finding
some merit to this argument, the Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that
there was no evidence that race had not predominated over these factors. See id.
171. See i. Specifically, the data were not available to the legislature in an
"'organized fashion'" prior to the creation of District 30. Id. (quoting Vera v. Richards,
861 F. Supp. 1304, 1338 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941
(1996)).
172. See i. at 1955-56. Approximately 97% of African-American voters in the Dallas
area vote Democratic, and thus numerous Democratic incumbents in surrounding districts
fought to keep these voters in their reconfigured area. See id. at 1956, 1959.
173. See id. at 1956; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133-34 (1986)
(overruling the district court's holding that any interference with an opportunity to elect a
representative of choice, unless justified by a compelling state interest, is an equal
protection violation, and requiring proof that the challenged plan will be detrimental
enough to require federal court intervention).
174. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1956 (applying Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,410 (1991)).
175. Id. at 1960 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1341 (S.D. Tex. 1994),
aff'd sub norn. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)). District 18 has a 51% African-
American and 15% Hispanic population, whereas District 29 is 61% Hispanic and 10%
African-American. See id. at 1958-59.
176. See id. at 1958-60.
177. See i. at 1963.
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Assuming that compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act could
be a compelling interest, the Court nevertheless rejected this
defense, finding that the lack of compactness and the bizarre shape
of the districts were evidence that the districts were not narrowly
tailored.78 The Court refused to adopt the district court's view that
narrow tailoring required a district with the "'least possible amount
of irregularity in shape.' "" Instead, the Court held that a § 2 district
that was "reasonably compact and regular" and that applied
traditional districting principles would survive strict scrutiny.8 ' The
Court also rejected Texas's second asserted state interest that the
creation of majority-minority districts was a means of rectifying
historical discrimination in voting. 1 As in Shaw I, the Court based
its decision on the absence of both specific evidence of
discrimination and a remedy directly applicable to the injury."8'
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that compliance with § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act was a compelling state interest that justified
the creation of District 18." The Court regarded the increase in
African-American representation within District 18 from 40.8% to
50.9% as augmentation, rather than mere maintenance, and thus not
within § 5's protection." The Court appeared to restrict severely the
future application of § 5 by finding that "[n]onretrogression is not a
license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to ensure
continued electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's
opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished,
directly or indirectly, by the State's actions."'"
In pursuing a final determination in Shaw IH, North Carolina's
counsel had two objectives: (1) to determine if North Carolina's
congressional districts were constitutional; and (2) to clarify the law
178. See id. at 1961.
179. Id. at 1960 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1994),
affd sub nor. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)).
180. Id. The Court emphasized that while bizarre shape on its own does not condemn a
district, if a district must have an extremely irregular shape to meet the minority
population requirement for a § 2 violation, then a state cannot be avoiding § 2 liability
"because § 2 does not require a State to create ... a district that is not 'reasonably
compact.'" Id. at 1961. Further, the appellants' argument that bizarre shape raised
questions regarding only motivation, and not narrow tailoring, was rejected by the Court
as a misinterpretation of its holding in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (discussed
supra at notes 95-114 and accompanying text). See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
181. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
182. See id





on racial gerrymandering and vote dilution.!" While Shaw II
definitely established that North Carolina's District 12 is
unconstitutional, it is unclear whether the decision clarified the law
on racial gerrymandering." Following Shaw I, voting rights law was
extremely unclear. The Shaw I Court held that a district "so bizarre
on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race" must
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest."
However, the Court did not indicate whether evidence of
discriminatory intent or bizarreness of shape was the determining
factor. Shaw 11provided the opportunity to clarify Shaw Ibecause in
Shaw 11, the Court reviewed the application of the Shaw I guidelines.
However, the Court failed to provide clarification, a fact noted by
Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion to Vera"s and by Justice
Stevens in his dissents to Shaw 1119 and Vera."9 Still, the Court
continues moving forward in this area, although it has "struck out
into a jurisprudential wilderness that lacks a definable constitutional
core and threatens to create harms more significant than any suffered
by the individual plaintiffs challenging these districts. ' 2
In Shaw 11 and Vera, the Supreme Court confronted the
constitutional limits of the deference given to state legislatures.
While the majority opinions recognized that a state should be
granted some leeway when drawing majority-minority districts, the
186. See Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Shaw v. Hunt 1996 and Beyond, Presentation at the
Public Law and the Public's awyers Continuing Legal Education Session, Raleigh, N.C.
(Sept. 17,1996).
187. See id. At least one commentator disagrees with this interpretation. Benjamin
Griffith has argued that Shaw II and Vera, combined with the previous cases, "form a
coherent body of precedent" clearly establishing a judicial commitment to several
principles of districting. Griffith, supra note 81, at 10-11. These principles include:
encouraging the use of "traditional districting principles," specifically "geographical
compactness, contiguity, and respect for existing political subdivision boundaries";
discouraging the automatic use of racial stereotypes; clarifying the "responsibilities ... of
legislative bodies in the redistricting process"; and ending the use of irregularly shaped
districts drawn without sufficient regard for "traditional districting principles." Id. at 10-
11.
188. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,644 (1993) (Shawl) (citations omitted).
189. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I believe that States and
lower courts are entitled to more definite guidance as they toil with the twin demands of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.").
190. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding the Court's
analysis of the compelling state interests raised by the state unsatisfactory).
191. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, "., dissenting) ("The decisions issued today
serve merely to reinforce my conviction that the Court has, with its 'analytically distinct'
jurisprudence of racial gerrymandering, struck out into a jurisprudential wilderness that
lacks a definable constitutional core ...... (citations omitted)).
192. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justices also encouraged states to limit the amount of consideration
given to race. By reviewing legislative intent and casting a critical
eye to unusually shaped districts, the Court established special
criteria limiting the application and use of majority-minority districts.
Interestingly, these criteria seem to apply only to majority-minority
districts; presumably, majority-Caucasian districts may be as
bizarrely shaped as the legislature desires.' Legislatures drawing
congressional districts rarely are presented with just one option.
Instead, several plans are likely to be offered during the process, and
the end result is generally a compromise of objectives and potential
results.' 4 In order to determine whether an injury has occurred in
redistricting cases, the reviewing court needs to be aware of
alternative plans. The need for this awareness effectively requires a
court to consider all of the legislature's alternatives, including any
plans submitted by legislators for the record, even if the plans lacked
any likelihood of passage. A court's review of legislative choices, in
addition to its review of the final result, pushes the prudential limits
of federal jurisdiction.' In effect, courts are required to determine if
the legislature made the correct choice among its options, a finding
that can only be subjective. 6 By continuing to treat this type of suit
as an equal protection claim, the Supreme Court has broadened the
reach of federal courts in race-based challenges to government
action." This result may be beneficial from the standpoint of
193. See id. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. For example, in the original redistricting in 1991 the legislature formally
considered four different congressional plans, each with revisions, so that nine options
were considered by the legislative body before the original submission for preclearance.
See William R. Gilkenson, A Chronology of North Carolina Redistricting in the 1990s 7-12
(June 1996) (unpublished report, available from the North Carolina General Assembly, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Similarly, in the redistricting that followed Shaw , nine plans and amendments were
presented to legislative bodies or committees. Additional plans were considered in the
negotiation process between the House and Senate redistricting committee chairs. All of
these plans, including those never submitted to a legislative committee or the full body,
were presented to the United States Department of Justice in the preclearance submission.
See Information Supporting North Carolina's Section 5 Submission for Its 1997
Congressional Redistricting Plan I 97C-27H (Apr. 9, 1997) (unpublished submission for
§ 5 preclearance to United States Department of Justice, available from the North
Carolina General Assembly) [hereinafter Submission]. Because these documents are now
public records, they also could be submitted to the district court judges for consideration
on remand.
195. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1909 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's
traditional hesitancy in determining matters that are ultimately differences of opinion
rather than discriminatory exclusion).
196. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 1912 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ensuring state conscientiousness in redistricting. However, when
considered with other procedural safeguards such as § 5
preclearance, continued judicial involvement threatens to tip the
delicate state-federal balance.
Both of the dissents in Vera foreshadowed the questionable
effects of continuing Shaw Ps line of authority and creating a new
realm of judicial review."s Without the benefit of a clear legal
standard as to what defines a constitutional district, and considering
the exorbitant legal costs of pursuing a judicial determination, a state
legislature may decide that its right to draw districts is not worth the
price. Such a "vacuum of responsibility" at the state level shifts the
burden of redistricting to federal courts.' According to Justice
Souter, the courts may no longer compel states to comply with
federal districting requirements since no such requirements have
been clearly set forth.2"0
Similarly, states fearing involvement in a costly lawsuit or just
the lengthy and time-consuming legislative process of drawing
districts may abdicate their authority in favor of districts drawn by
courts. This is precisely what occurred in Georgia following the
Miller v. Johnson"' decision; when the state legislature was unable to
reach a compromise on a new plan, it ultimately gave up and allowed
the district court to draw the state's congressional district plan. 2 If
198. Justice Stevens argued that the Court's jurisprudence in this area continues to
result in unintended consequences. Primarily, race has become the predominant factor in
redistricting. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also
noted that deference to states is challenged by the current path, a position at odds with the
Court's recent protection of state sovereignty in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114 (1996). See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Caught between
the Voting Rights Act and the Court's current position, states will find avoiding litigation
extremely difficult. See id at 1991 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens questioned
whether states will choose to forego their right to redistrict, or worse, allow political
motives and power to overtake the process. See id. at 1991-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter raised similar concerns about the fate of redistricting in his Vera
dissent. See id at 1998-2000 (Souter, J., dissenting). Arguing that the Court's position
undermines the traditional state principles used to establish a baseline for redistricting, he
noted that the Court has traditionally recognized the associational character of voting,
while Shaw I broke from this position. See iU at 2000-01 (Souter, J., dissenting). Unless
the Court chooses to overrule Shaw 1, it is left with two alternatives that raise objections of
their own. See id. at 2007-09.
199. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 2006-07 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); see also supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text
(discussing Georgia's original redistricting review process and the Supreme Court
opinion).
202. See Mark Sherman, Redistricting back in Hands of Federal Court, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 13, 1995, at Al. In fact, observers and legislators began to view the role of
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transferring the duty in the face of difficulty becomes commonplace,
state legislatures that are split over non-racial issues, such as party
affiliation, may separate themselves from the redistricting process,
foisting the responsibility onto already overloaded district courts.
Shifting the responsibility for districting also causes harms other
than impingement on state authority. As Justice Stevens warned,
judicial preemption may reduce the integrity of the courts by
removing their appearance of impartiality."° As if acknowledging
the unintended effect of its voting rights decisions, the Supreme
Court recently took great pains to reiterate that congressional
apportionment is a state responsibility."° Yet, in Shaw HI and Vera,
the Court returned to its position of increasing federal authority by
ruling districts unconstitutional without providing clear guidelines on
the injury or acceptable means of correcting it. The Court forced
states back into the federal courts by keeping them uninformed of
the requirements for a constitutional district.
By advocating the states' role in districting, but obscuring the
states' alternatives, the Court's decisions manifest the underlying
federal courts in redistricting in a new light during the Georgia legislature's special session
on redistricting. Whereas court intervention was viewed initially as a means of forcing
legislators to draw new boundaries quickly, it ultimately had the reverse effect. After
Republicans in the General Assembly saw early congressional maps drawn by the
Democratic leadership that placed GOP incumbents in the same new districts, they took
the position that "they'd just as soon take their chances with the courts." Kathey
Alexander, Retreat on Redistricting, ATLANTA CoNST., Sept. 13, 1995, at C2. Similar
thoughts were expressed by black legislators after seeing the maps drawn by white
Democrats. See id Instead of leading to coalition-building, the possibility of judicial
intervention led to divisive entrenchment. The complexity of the requirements placed on
legislatures is evident in Lieutenant Governor Pierre Howard's statement that the fault in
not agreeing on a new plan lay in "trying to settle a legal issue in a political session." Id.
However, redistricting is inherently legal and political, and the legislature is the
governmental body charged with striking the balance.
203. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1991 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1999 n.2
(Souter, I., dissenting) (noting the Court's historical reluctance to enter into this "political
thicket"). Of course, these warnings should sound familiar, as dissenting Justices have
warned the Court of the potential effect of its involvement in this area since 1962. See,
e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's
complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.").
204. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 156 (1993) ("Federal courts are barred
from intervening in state apportionment in the absence of a violation of federal law
precisely because it is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct
apportionment in the first place."). The conflict between state and federal powers is
discussed more fully infra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
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tension between judicial activism and states' rights.2' The
Constitution gives state legislatures the power to create districts for
the election of members of the House of Representatives, 6 and the
Supreme Court traditionally has limited its involvement in this
area." In Shaw I, the Court first departed from this respect for state
authority and adopted a less traditional interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Rather than identifying the suit as a
racial gerrymandering claim similar to those previously reviewed,2"
the Court loosely recognized the harm done to the plaintiff by a plan
that used race as an indicator of individuals who think and act alike,
and presumably prefer the same political candidates.21 According to
the Court, it followed that representatives of a district established as
a majority-minority district view themselves as representing the
specified majority within the district, rather than the individual
constituents.211 Justice Souter argued in his Vera dissent that this line
205. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
206. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
207. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1999 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's deference
to state legislative authority over districting, as evidenced by the Court's use of traditional
state districting practices as a baseline for determining the acceptability of districting
plans); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTUTIONAL LAW 734-
35 (5th ed. 1995) (recognizing that pre-Shaw I rulings generally fell into three categories:
(1) rulings that corrected specific acts of voting discrimination; (2) rulings that allowed
Congress some regulatory authority over state and local elections; and (3) rulings that
lacked clear direction on the extent to which Congress and states might act to help
minority voters).
208. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 2001 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that Shaw I "broke
abruptly with these standards [of judicial deference], including the very understanding of
equal protection as a practical guarantee against harm to some class singled out for
disparate treatment").
209. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124-25
(1986) (finding that a lack of opportunity for members of a racial or political group to elect
representatives of their choice results in a justiciable question); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364
U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (recognizing that state action may not be taken to withdraw the vote
from a group of citizens).
210. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 2002 (Souter, J., dissenting). This injury has been
interpreted as an "expressive" harm that "results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material
consequences the action brings about." Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L REV. 483,506-07 (1993). Under this rubric, a legislative
action may cause harm based on the meaning it conveys about traditional values,
regardiess of the effect actually created. See id. at 507.
211. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 2002 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (Shawl) (" 'Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed,
or his color. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be
represented by a Negro .... That system ... is a divisive force in a community,
emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the
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of cases was particularly dangerous because the cases did not state a
"practical standard for distinguishing between the lawful and
unlawful use of race. 21 1 Indeed, Justice Souter argued that the
Court failed to identify the injury required for a claim. Instead, the
Court's analysis focused on a harm commonly found among voters
dissatisfied with the use of race in the allocation of political power.
Justice Souter's position that the Court failed to define clearly the
requisite injury is manifested in the difficulty state legislatures have
in creating redistricting plans. A state's representatives hardly can
avoid causing an injury to its citizens if they cannot determine what
the injury is.
Harm of this type would seem to affect all races equally, and
thus would not violate the Fourteenth Amendment under the
traditional interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.2 4
However, the Court in Shaw I recognized a cognizable claim under
the Equal Protection Clause, but failed to delineate clearly what
legislative action would be viewed as a violation. The resulting
confusion has led state legislatures to depend upon our nation's
courts, and ultimately upon the Supreme Court, for guidance in
determining what criteria they may contemplate in the redistricting
constitutional sense.' " (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting))).
Although it is unclear whether this divisive representation by a candidate has
occurred in any majority-minority districts, the inverse-individual constituents believing
themselves to be unrepresented-has been noticed by some representatives. Cynthia
McKinney, a Representative from Georgia's Eleventh District, found her support from
white constituents slipping following the filing of the Georgia lawsuit. She notes the
farmers' tour she organized in 1994 to meet with the Secretary of Agriculture over the
drought in Georgia: despite an organized effort and mailings to every farmer in the
District, she was unable to get a single white farmer from the Eleventh District to join the
tour. See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 19, 1995), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnews File. Cynthia McKinney's reelection following the reconfiguring
of Georgia's districts by the federal court also may be a testimonial to this point. After her
district was reduced from 64% African-American to approximately one-third African-
American, she survived a tough reelection campaign by running a multiracial campaign
and drawing heavily on women voters and supporters. See John Nichols, Georgia's
Cinderella Story: Soccer Moms Meet Welfare Moms in the Redistricted Campaign of
Cynthia McKinney, NATION, Nov. 11, 1996, at 16, 16-19.
212. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his statement that "[t]his is so
for reasons that go to the conceptual bone," id, Justice Souter seemed to indicate that the
Court lacks a majority consensus on any one interpretation. This underlying division
within the Court was evident in the cases preceding Shaw II and Vera, discussed supra in
notes 70-114 and accompanying text, and may have reached a pinnacle in these two
opinions.
213. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 2001-02 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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process.2 5 According to Justice Stevens, these cases force states to
"draw the precise district[s] that [they] believe[] a federal court
would have the power to impose."1 6 In effect, the principles of
federalism have been reversed. Instead of the Court following the
lead of state legislatures in determining acceptable standards, the
state legislatures are looking to the Court for permissible factors and
criteria in establishing their districts.217
Despite this conflict between states' rights and judicial
intervention, the Court continues to refine standards for reviewing
legislative redistricting." ' This refinement has included additional
215. See id. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting).
216. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1922 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. The strain that this competition between state and federal rights creates within the
Court is evident in the Justices' votes. Four of the nine Justices-Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer--have either authored or joined opinions indicating their concern
with the federalism conflict. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1921-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2499-500
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer). Ironically,
Justice O'Connor, the only member of the Court to have served in a state legislature and a
strong states' rights advocate, has not argued this position. The notable absence of Justice
O'Connor on this issue, and the fact that most of the Justices opposed to this entrance into
state action are relatively recent appointees, suggest the possibility of future changes in
the Court's decisions.
218. Although a majority of the Court is well-settled on the application of strict
scrutiny in this context, Justice Stevens continues to argue that a different standard should
be applied in situations where the majority attempts to increase the effectiveness of
minority involvement in the democratic institution. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1907
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens first suggested a three-part vote dilution test in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). He provided an
objective analysis protecting districting systems based on a "good government" approach,
even if the decision-making process had been compromised by ulterior motives. See id. at
90-91 (Stevens, J., concurring). In subsequent opinions, Justice Stevens expanded his
criticism of the subjective motivational system applied by the Court. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 637 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). This form of analysis benefits the decision-making body because it recognizes
a vote dilution claim only when a neutral justification cannot be articulated convincingly.
See Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Power: An Exploration of the
Conflict Between the Judicial "Intent" and the Legislative Results Standards, 50 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 689,722-24 (1982).
While consistent in this view, Justice Stevens alone advocates it. Several Justices are
likely to be hostile to the idea; both Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas in separate
concurring opinions to Vera noted that the Court's summary affirmation of DeWin v.
Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), summarily aff'd in part and dismissed in part,
115 S. Ct. 2637 (1995), resolved only the issue of constitutionality between the parties and
did not indicate any acceptance of the conscious use of race. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1971
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Also,
given the opportunity in previous cases to establish a lower standard of review for benign
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review of the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Because North
Carolina and Texas both raised compliance with the Voting Rights
Act as a possible compelling state interest, Shaw II and Vera provide
further insight into the current interpretation of § 2 and § 5, and the
role of these sections in legislative redistricting.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires the Attorney
General to review proposed changes in districting plans and to
determine that the proposed changes do not "have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color."" 9 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
requirement as meaning only that a proposed plan may not result in
retrogression of the opportunity of members of a minority group to
elect representatives of their choice°--the plan need not augment or
enhance that right." In Vera, the Court extended its interpretation
of nonretrogression to include the proportion of minorities within a
district.m By increasing the proportion of minorities in the districts,
Texas did more than was necessary to ensure that its new plan did
not result in a retrogression of minority opportunity.'
The greatest effect of the Court's use of strict scrutiny in
redistricting cases has been the narrowing of § 5. Shaw II was
consistent with the Miller decision in its criticism of the Department
of Justice's interpretation of § 5.' Shaw 11 was particularly critical of
racial classification, the Supreme Court has refused to do so. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493
(plurality opinion).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
220. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
221. By definition, any plan that is "ameliorative" has increased an individual's
opportunity to elect a candidate of her choice, and therefore is considered
nonretrogressive. The terms do not have identical meanings, but "ameliorative" may be
used instead of "nonretrogressive." Cf. RICHARD K. ScHER Er AL., VOTING RIGHTS &
DEMOCRACY 55 (1997) (stating that an ameliorative plan demonstrates a greater level of
concern for minority voting than does a nonretrogressive plan).
222. The Court found that District 18 was not narrowly tailored to comply with § 5
because it increased the proportion of African-Americans within the district from 40.8%
(at the time of the 1980 census) to 50.9% (following the 1990 census). See Vera, 116 S. Ct.
at 1963. Texas argued that this change was necessary because minority candidates
previously had been elected from the district and the increase ensured continued minority
success. See i In denying this contention, the plurality opinion stated that
nonretrogression is not to be applied to minority candidates' actual success, but to the
minority population's opporunity to elect representatives of its choice. See id.
223. See id.
224. Compare Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2493 (1995) ("In utilizing § 5 to
require States to create majority-minority districts wherever possible, the Department of
Justice expanded its authority under the statute beyond what Congress intended and we
have upheld."), with Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1904 ("We again reject the Department's
expansive interpretation of § 5.").
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the Justice Department's policy of intentional maximization of
majority-minority districts.' In Miller, the Court contrasted
"nonretrogressive" and "ameliorative" plans."s Any plan that
provides greater opportunity for minority success appears to be
ameliorative, and is nonretrogressive by definition.m Thus, any
redistricting plan that includes more majority-minority districts than
previously existed must be precleared under § 5, even if more
majority-minority districts could be created. m
Section 5 may be interpreted as having two different prongs for
possible violations: the "purpose" prongem and the "results" prong."
In Shaw II, the United States contended that the Justice Department
properly denied preclearance because North Carolina's proposed
plan violated the purpose prong of § 5.n1 However, in Shaw 11 and in
Vera, the Court applied a pure results standard."2 Under a results-
225. Compare Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492 ("Wherever a plan is 'ameliorative,' ... it
'cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race
or color ....'" (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976))), with Shaw 1i,
116 S. Ct. at 1904 (holding that North Carolina's original plan was indisputably
ameliorative and thus could not be subject to § 5 liability).
226. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2492.
227. See id.
228. See id. ("The State's policy of adhering to other districting principles instead of
creating as many majority-minority districts as possible does not support an inference that
the plan 'so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution."'
(quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141)). Under this interpretation, North Carolina's stated
interest in avoiding § 5 liability was rejected. A majority of the Court has not said whether
a valid interest in avoiding § 5 liability could be a compelling interest for state action,
though Justice Stevens would find that it is. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1918 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). His view appears to be reasonable, and probably is acceptable to the rest of
the Court, especially when considered in application to the preclearance process as
codified. When the Attorney General notifies a submitting authority of its decision to
object to the proposed plan, the authority has limited options. Under the guidelines, the
submitting authority may ask the Attorney General to reconsider the objection or seek a
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
See 28 C.F.R. § 51.44 (1995). Taking remedial action consistent with the Attorney
General's suggestions likely would provide the least expensive and most timely solution
for states. Thus, if the Attorney General were to interpret § 5 correctly, acting in
accordance with the request would seem to be a compelling state interest.
229. The "purpose" prong refers to the guideline established by § 5 that the proposed
change "does not have the purpose" of reducing voting strength based on race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1994).
230. The "results" prong refers to § 5's requirement that any change be denied that has
"the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote." Id.
231. See Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1904.
232. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1963; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1904. Most recently, the Court
explained its position on § 5 in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 117 S. Ct. 1491, 1501
(1997). In considering the use of § 2 evidence for a § 5 determination, the Court noted
once again the two prongs of § 5. The Court explained that it has interpreted the purpose
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only interpretation, changes that do not have a clear racial effect
would be allowed even if the intent was to reduce a racial group's
voting strength incrementally. This interpretation conflicts with the
plain language of § 5.' Furthermore, in 1982, Congress amended § 2
of the Voting Rights Act to counteract a similarly narrow
interpretation of that provision.' In its interpretation of § 5, the
Court clearly established that in the choice between "what will do"
and "what might have been," "what will do" is sufficient.s
Despite the Court's sharp criticism of the Attorney General's
maximization principles, states requiring judicial preclearance must
still present a plan with sufficient minority representation to receive
approval from the Department of Justice. This appears to place
states between the proverbial rock and a hard place-they must
undertake action that optimizes minority involvement in order to
satisfy the Justice Department, but they must do so without altering
the preferred position of the white majority and thereby risking a
Shaw claim. The Justice Department's new interpretation of § 5
therefore becomes crucial to state legislatures attempting to draw
constitutional districts. According to Deval Patrick, the former
Assistant United States Attorney General for Civil Rights:
These decisions do not mean the end of minority
representation as we know it. They certainly do not mean
that states can abandon their obligation under the Voting
Rights Act and the Constitution to ensure fair
representation and provide minority voters with an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice."6
Speaking after Shaw II, Patrick recognized that the Justice
Department had been chastised severely by the Court. 7 He also
acknowledged that § 5 clearly did not stand for the principle that if a
language of this portion in accordance with the purpose language underlying § 5, which
ensures that voting changes do not result in retrogression. See hL at 1501-02. Under this
interpretation, the only results violation is retrogression. See id. at 1502. Because the
Court found that "evidence of a plan's dilutive impact may be relevant" to the purpose
prong of § 5 but is not necessarily "dispositive of that inquiry," id, it is clear that the
purpose prong still exists, even if it is unclear what it now means.
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (stating that a districting plan may not have the "purpose"
or the "effect" of "abridging the right to vote").
234. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional
purpose behind § 2).
235. In fact, echoing the questions raised by the states' rights issue, see supra notes 183-
85,193-200 and accompanying text, if a state chooses to do more than absolutely necessary
to improve minority voting strength it will not only have done more than § 5 requires, but
may also find itself liable for doing too much.
236. Remarks of Deval Patrick, supra note 1.
237. See id.
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legislature can draw a majority-minority district, it must do so."
However, the Justice Department intends to continue to be an active
participant in the redistricting process, and will require that states
provide valid and nonpretextual explanations of any subordination
of traditional redistricting principles. ' The Voting Rights Act still
requires fair representation and equal opportunity in votes cast, and
the Justice Department will not "cede its responsibility to enforce the
Voting Rights Act with vigor and tenacity."2 4 Whether this means
that states still must meet two different standards both to satisfy § 5
preclearance and to bar a Shaw claim remains undetermined. 4'
A second compelling state interest defense that North Carolina
raised in Shaw 11 and that Texas raised in Vera was compliance with
238. See id. While Deval Patrick was not in his current position at the time that
Georgia and North Carolina were denied preclearance, he argued that it is not and never
has been the policy of the Justice Department to require maximization. See id. In support
of this assertion, he noted that the Justice Department often precleared plans that
contained less than the maximum number of majority-minority districts available. See id.
On a theoretical basis, he argued that majority-minority districts should not be created to
provide for proportional minority candidates because "[n]o discrete group in our society
has such a vested right. Moreover, experience has shown that minorities can be effectively
represented by whites-and vice versa-most of the time." Id. But, he noted, the political
process should be equally open to all citizens. See Uid Justice Stevens made much this
same point in his dissent to Shaw II: "There is no necessary correlation between race-
based districting assignments and inadequate representation.... Indeed, any assumption
that such a correlation exists could only be based on a stereotypical assumption about the
kind of representation that politicians elected by minority voters are capable of
providing." Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1911 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
239. Remarks of Deval Patrick, supra note 1. While the administration of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division certainly will change following Mr. Patrick's
resignation, presumably the sentiment he expressed will continue.
240. Id.
241. Double standards are especially troublesome to states once litigation begins.
North Carolina and Texas found their submissions and proceedings seeking § 5
preclearance used as evidence against them in Shaw II and Vera to show that race had
been the predominant factor in drawing districts. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1952-53; Shaw II,
116 S. Ct. at 1904. This is an ironic twist, as the purpose of preclearance is to assure the
Attorney General that the interests of minority voters have been adequately considered
and protected; thus, the submissions are likely to focus on these factors. See Vera, 116 S.
Ct. at 1985 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Both the North Carolina and Texas districts also were challenged initially as political
gerrymanders. See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C.) (original North
Carolina challenge), summarily aff'd, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp.
828, 830 (W.D. Tex.) (original Texas challenge), aff'd, 505 U.S. 1214 (1992). In the Texas
case, the district court and the plurality of Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Kennedy construed the earlier testimony of state representatives that "race was
the primary consideration in the construction of District 30" as undercutting the state's
claim that race was only one of several motivating factors. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1957.
Thus, the adversarial process of maximizing the benefits of one's case provides dangerous
pitfalls for the next challenge.
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§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 is broader than § 5, and
provides that "[n]o voting qualification or ... procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State ... which results in the denial or
abridgment of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race
or color."' 42 In Shaw II and Vera, the Court assumed for the sake of
argument that § 2 compliance was a compelling state interest, but
rejected the North Carolina and Texas plans for not being narrowly
tailored. The Court never reached the question of whether
compliance with § 2 is, in fact, a compelling state interest.243
While the Court did not resolve the question of whether § 2
compliance is a compelling state interest, it did address narrow
tailoring, the second stage of strict scrutiny review. The Court
addressed two factors determining whether a majority-minority
district created under § 2 is narrowly tailored: (1) the geographic
compactness of the minority group and district; and (2) the need for
a direct correlation between the injured minorities and the remedy
district.
A minority group must be geographically compact in order for
§ 2 to necessitate a majority-minority district.2" Compactness is a
basic element of § 2 districts, and has been required since the Court
established the Gingles factors.' If members of a minority group do
not live sufficiently close together, § 2 does not require a state
legislature to draw a non-compact district.2" Thus, when a non-
compact district is drawn to include a non-compact minority
population, the fact that the district is narrowly tailored does not
establish its constitutionality because § 2 does not even require the
district. The plurality opinion in Vera found this reasoning
242. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
243. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1960; Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1905. However, in three
separate opinions in Vera, five of the Justices expressly stated that compliance with § 2 is a
compelling state interest. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring); ia at
1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 2007 (Souter, I., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined Justices Stevens's and Souter's dissents. See id. at 1950.
244. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993)
(applying the Gingles preconditions to single-member districts); Thomburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30,50-51 (1986) (establishing the preconditions for a § 2 district)); see also Vera, 116
S. Ct. at 1961 (referring to Gingles).
245. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. The first requirement is that the minority group be
sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single-member
district. See id. The second requirement is that the minority group be politically cohesive,
and the third requirement is that the minority group be able to demonstrate that the
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority candidate. See id. at 51.
246. See ad. at 50.
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consistent with the opinion in Johnson v. DeGrandy.27
Justice Stevens argued that narrowly tailoring a district to
remedy a § 2 violation is not as constrained as the Vera plurality
suggested. In his dissenting opinion in Vera, Justice Stevens asserted
that a state's remedy for a § 2 violation is not limited to drawing
compact majority-minority districts.m Instead, Justice Stevens stated
that a non-compact district may be narrowly tailored when created
by a state legislature, although not necessarily if decreed as a judicial
remedy.4 ' Furthermore, in his Shaw 11 dissent Justice Stevens relied
on DeGrandy, the same precedent cited by the majority, to argue
that North Carolina's plan was narrowly tailored based on the
inclusion of a second majority-minority district."o According to
Justice Stevens, the second district protected the state against a
potential claim that more districts could have been drawn, and
established that the plan was based on the "totality of the
circumstances. ' ' 51
Writing for the Court in Shaw II, Chief Justice Rehnquist
specifically debated Justice Stevens's interpretation of DeGrandy.
He found Justice Stevens's use of DeGrandy flawed based on Justice
Stevens's failure to acknowledge the DeGrandy Court's presumption
that the Florida districts at issue in that case were lawfully drawn,
and on the express statement in DeGrandy that a § 2 claim required
the "'possibility of creating more than the existing number of
reasonably compact districts.' ,,I2 Thus, according to the Chief
247. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961 ("If, because of the dispersion of the minority
population, a reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does
not require a majority-minority district; if a reasonably compact district can be created,
nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district that is far from compact.").
But, while § 2 does not require a non-compact district, it does not forbid such a district
either, as long as the criteria used to develop the district are acceptable. See id at 1972
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
248. See id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1920-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). After considering the Gingles preconditions, a court
or districting group should then review the "totality of the circumstances" to determine
whether members of a protected class have less opportunity to participate in the electoral
process, thereby establishing a § 2 violation. See i. at 1905 (citing Johnson v. DeGrandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1000 (1994)); see also supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (reviewing
DeGrandy).
252. Shaw 1, 116 S. Ct. at 1906 n.8 (quoting DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1008) (alteration in
original). Justice Stevens also made the compelling argument that in requiring states to
draw districts both compact and narrowly tailored under these circumstances, the Court is
requiring a state to "draw the precise district that it believes a federal court would have
the power to impose.... [This] forces States to imagine the legally 'correct' outcome of a
1997] 2187
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Justice, the Court should compare the proposed plan to the status
quo, not to other plans that could possibly be created.
Two Justices joined Justice Stevens' dissents in Shaw 11 and
Vera, making the correlation between narrowly tailored and non-
compact districts appear somewhat unsettled.' Since DeGrandy
arguably supports either position, a future shift in the majority on
this issue is possible.' In any future review of narrow tailoring, the
determining factor may be the shape of the district and the
geographically compact presence of the minority population. Where
minority groups form substantial portions of the population within a
relatively small area, a comparatively easy § 2 claim may arise."
However, when minorities form a substantial portion of the total
population but do not live in segregated units, the intent behind § 2
is much more difficult to discern.! The debate continues because a
majority of the Court has not clearly identified the balancing point
between representative and contortionist districts.
The second factor in narrow tailoring of a § 2 district is whether
the § 2 district directly remedies the injured minority group. On this
point, the Shaw I Court is clear. If a § 2 defense is pled, the remedy
district must address the established § 2 violation.27  North
Carolina's Twelfth District did not encompass the areas of the state
in which the Gingles criteria suggested a violation existed, although
there was some argument as to whether the district included some of
these areas." In the absence of a § 2 injury to the general
lawsuit that has not even been filed." Id. at 1922 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing this intrusion upon states rights).
253. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer); Shaw ii, 116 S. Ct. at 1920-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
254. Justice Stevens's argument blurred the distinction between a § 2 and a § 5 Voting
Rights Act claim. Typically, district maximization arguments have arisen in the context of
§ 5 liability. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text. Here, Justice Stevens raised
it with a § 2 claim, based on the numerical or geographical criteria within the Gingles
preconditions. For the Court to accept this position, it must be willing to accept Justice
Stevens's contention that non-compact districts may be an acceptable remedy. Otherwise,
the maximization argument is moot because the compactness requirement is inherently
self-limiting.
255. Indeed, this is the historical precedent behind the Voting Rights Act. In order to
submerge minority voting presence, states drew districts to separate geographically
compact communities, thus dividing the votes among several district, so that none of the
votes had a chance of being combined with those of similar interests. See supra note 25
and accompanying text.
256. This situation is exactly that faced in North Carolina. African-Americans make up
approximately 22% of the total population, but are dispersed throughout the state.
257. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
258. See iUL at 1906-07 (noting that District 12 incorporates the same urban component
that alternative majority-minority districts have included).
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population, the Court held that a generalized remedy was
inappropriate, rejecting North Carolina's "general injury"
interpretation of § 2."9 The Court asserted that § 2 was designed to
protect the right of each individual to vote, whereas the "general
injury" interpretation sought to guarantee the right to vote to
minorities as a group.26
In addition to compliance with the Voting Rights Act, North
Carolina and Texas raised remedying past discrimination as a
compelling state interest. In both Shaw 11 and Vera, the Supreme
Court rejected this justification for the challenged districts.261 The
Court did not deny that either state had a history of discrimination,
or that the effects of discrimination remained, as exemplified by the
bloc voting of the white population. However, the Court in Shaw 11
found that North Carolina's legislators lacked sufficient background
information during the redistrictingprocess for past discrimination to
provide a compelling state interest.2 2 Instead of a generalized injury,
the Court wanted evidence of "identified discrimination" and a
"strong basis in evidence" that remedial action was necessary.2"
These criteria do not eliminate this historical interest as a defense,
but they do establish a need for certain evaluations to be performed
so that the evidence is before legislators during the redistricting
process.2'  The Gingles criteria are the most accepted form of
259. She id. at 1906 ("To accept that the district may be placed anywhere implies that
the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote .. ., belongs to the minority
as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.").
260. See i However, the contradiction in wording between the Voting Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment exemplifies the conflict in their intent. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1994) (stating that a violation of the right to vote occurs when "the political
processes ... are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens"), with
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. I (stating that no state may "deny to any person" the
equal protection of the laws). The Equal Protection Clause consistently has been applied
to claims of individuals; it is unlikely that the Court would be willing to establish
compliance with § 2 as a compelling state interest if the claim were brought on behalf of a
protected group rather than the individual.
261. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962-63; Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1902-03.
262. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1902-03. The district court, which would have validated
the district, did not accept this argument as compelling. See id; see also Vera, 116 S. Ct. at
1963 (reiterating this point established in Shaw 1).
263. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962; Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1902-03. However, the Court
has provided little guidance as to what evidence will be acceptable.
264. The evaluations must be compiled and available at the time the districts are
drawn. In Shaw 1, the Supreme Court noted that two reports compiled by a historian and
a social scientist supported the legislature's contentions; however, since these reports were
prepared for litigation, they were disallowed by the Court because the legislature could not
have previously relied upon them. See Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1903. In Vera, Texas had
relied on its history of voting discrimination exhibited in the case law and § 5 Voting
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evaluating vote dilution, and they are essential to a § 2 claim.2"
Although not expressly stated, the Court appeared to require that
the strong basis in evidence test for a § 2 claim be satisfied for a
successful use of this defense.
The Court's requirement of strong, timely evidence of
discrimination is consistent with its requirements for proof in a
traditional vote dilution claim;2" however, the effect is different
because the state must have established its position prior to a suit
being filed. Legislators may not rely on their own awareness of
political and social norms within the state if they are to present
successfully a "strong basis in evidence." Evidence of this type
would only be anecdotal in nature; however, in the absence of a
recent study or survey of voting in the state, this may be the only
evidence available. If scholarly studies verifying the legislators'
anecdotal evidence are performed later, they will be denigrated by
the Court as post hoc rationalizations. 67
Taken together, the majority and plurality opinions in Shaw 11
and Vera indicate the Court's current position, as well as future
issues that are likely to arise. While leaving open some questions,
such as the increased tension between federal courts and state
legislatures,2' and the continued recognition of a claim without an
articulable injury,'69 these decisions do indicate factors for state
legislatures to consider when determining whether a district is
justified by a compelling state interest, and whether it is narrowly
tailored to satisfy such an interest." ° Because of the Court's closely
divided position, Justice O'Connor's separate concurring opinion
deserves special attention as an indicator of how the open questions
may be further resolved.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence to Vera"' is significant for two
primary reasons. First, Justice O'Connor specifically stated that her
Rights Act coverage as a historical record, but the Court apparently did not find this
material satisfactory. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1962-63.
265. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
266. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41-42 (1993) (finding the district court in error
for assuming the presence of racial bloc voting rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove
that such voting occurred in the specific area); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-53
(1986) (determining a racial bloc voting claim based primarily on a special study prepared
for plaintiffs).
267. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1955; Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1903.
268. See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 219-67 and accompanying text.
271. Justice O'Connor signed the plurality opinion, but wrote a separate concurring
opinion to explain her reasoning. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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intent was to provide a more structured framework for the general
principles articulated in the Shaw II majority and Vera plurality
opinions." Second, Justice O'Connor appears to be the Court's
swing vote on this issue. Most of the Justices have articulated and
maintained their respective positions. Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer are firmly opposed to limiting the application
of the Voting Rights Act, particularly when it has been used to
increase minority participation in the electoral process. 3 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas believe
just as firmly that these restrictions are necessary to safeguard the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Justice O'Connor, however, is a moving
target; her opinions have varied in their valuation of factors, and
districting groups have had difficulty determining what will win her
approval.'7 Moreover, she appears to have been the deciding vote in
several voting rights cases."7 6 Because of her position as the swing
vote, some commentators believe that Justice O'Connor's Vera
concurrence reveals the necessary guidelines for drawing
constitutional districts.n
272. See id. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
273. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Breyer);
Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Breyer); Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2500-01 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice
Breyer) (noting the areas of agreement within the Court and the point on which it divides).
See generally Aim6e D. Latimer, Note, Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Eases the
Burden of Proving Racial Gerrymandering, 27 LoY. U. Cm. IJ. 97, 146 (1995) (discussing
the split in the Court in the context of Miller).
274. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1971-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1973 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (Joined by Justice Scalia). Chief Justice Rehnquist's position
is inferred from the fact that he authored the Shaw H1 opinion and joined the majority in
these cases. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1950; Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1899; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2482.
275. Interview with Adam Stein, Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter,
P.A., in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 17, 1996). Some scholars have speculated that Justice
O'Connor initially voted to affirm the North Carolina District Court decision, holding that
District 12 was narrowly tailored, but found the Texas districts unconstitutional. She then
wrote this concurrence to establish the analysis she used in reaching these decisions. As
the Supreme Court's deliberations are not public, this theory is based purely on
circumstantial evidence. See Under the Dome, Scholars Speculate on 12th, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 24, 1996, at A3.
276. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1950 (providing the third vote to the plurality opinion, with
two Justices concurring in the judgment, and filing her own concurring opinion); Shaw HI,
116 S. Ct. at 1898 (providing the fifth vote to the majority opinion); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2482 (joining the five-Justice majority, but also filing a concurring opinion); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 632 (1993) (Shaw 1) (joining the five-Justice majority and delivering the
opinion of the Court).
277. See Anthony A. Peacock, The Supreme Court and the Future of Voting Rights, in
AFFIRMATIVE AcTION, supra note 86, at 407 (noting that Justice O'Connor's concurring
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Justice O'Connor's first guideline provides that "so long as they
do not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race
for its own sake or as a proxy, States may intentionally create
majority-minority districts, and may otherwise take race into
consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny.' ' 8 In support of
this proposition, she cites both the plurality opinion and the
dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and Souter"9 Curiously, this
point is more strongly supported by the text of the dissenting
opinions.' For instance, in his analysis, Justice Stevens considered
the Texas redistricting plan on a factor-by-factor basis, asserting that
at least two traditional nonracial factors-community"l and
incumbency protection ---were not subordinated to race. In
opinion was "perhaps the most important opinion in either case"); Edwin M. Speas, Jr.,
Senior Deputy Attorney General, Remarks at the Meeting of the Senate Select
Committee on Redistricting (July 10, 1996) (transcript available in Submission, supra note
194, 97C-28F-4D(1)).
278. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1969 (O'Connor, I., concurring) (emphasis added).
279. See id (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing id. at 1951-52 (plurality opinion); id. at
1976-78 & n.8, 1985 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2003, 2007, 2011 (Souter, J.,
dissenting)). Justice O'Connor also emphasized that strict scrutiny is applicable when
there is a nexus between the neglect of traditional districting criteria and that neglect is
due to the misuse of race. See id. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
280. See id. at 1977-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (theorizing that all equal protection
determinations are really a form of rational basis scrutiny, that the term "strict scrutiny"
describes only the likelihood of success, and that classifications based on race rarely have
been considered to have a legitimate basis); ia at 2003 (Souter, J., dissenting) (advocating
that the court not find a Shaw Iinjury when attention was paid to race simply to remedy or
avoid dilution, and supporting the plurality opinion that strict scrutiny not be applicable in
all situations). But both dissents also noted that while the plurality may hold open the
option of something less than strict scrutiny, it has failed to exercise that position. See id.
at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The plurality's statement that strict scrutiny 'does [not]
apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts,' merely caps a long
line of discussions, stretching from Shaw I to Shaw II, which have both expressly and
implicitly set forth precisely that conclusion." (citation omitted)); id at 2003 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
281. See id at 1985-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the district court found the
appellants' descriptions of the communities of interest based on "land use, family
demographics, and transportation corridors" as an accurate depiction of the district, it
decided these were not legitimate legislative considerations because they lacked
evidentiary support. See id. at 1985 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
282. See id. at 1986-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This argument is even more convincing
due to the strong evidence supporting it. The fact that Justice O'Connor did not accept it
is puzzling because she is the only current member of the Court to have held political
office, and she tends to apply a very "politics is politics" approach to questions of political
intervention. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor views the two issues as entirely separate-
while race is a matter of biology, political affiliation is key to the political trade and
judicial intervention in this area creates risk in the legislative arena. See id. at 161
(O'Connor, 3., concurring in the judgment). It is possible that Justice O'Connor neglected
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contrast, Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment and joined by
Justice Scalia, argued that strict scrutiny applied to all race-based
classifications by the government.' Once a state created a majority-
minority district, as Texas admitted it did, the state crossed beyond
mere awareness of race. Under these circumstances, Justices
Thomas and Scalia believed that the plan should be subjected to
strict scrutiny.' Meanwhile, in his concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy took issue with Justice O'Connor's assertion that strict
scrutiny is applicable only when race predominates.'
In drawing a new district, it may be helpful to limit the
consideration of race. However, such a limitation is inherently weak
in the long run. Once a majority-minority district is created and a
minority representative is elected, a districting organization can no
longer consider that district in terms of race. 6 Section 5 cannot be
used to justify an increase in the percentage of minorities within the
district, even if the party responsible for drawing new districts
considers such a measure necessary to provide for incumbency
protection. Thus, in an ironic twist, the minority representative will
be denied incumbency protection to which non-minority
representatives are entitled.' Other race-neutral districting criteria
are not required by the Constitution, but have been adopted by the
Court based on the general criteria used by states. However, .the
Court did not give any weight to the fact that North Carolina and
Texas followed their own historical application of contiguity and
to recognize the political factors present in order to keep the case strictly racial, and
therefore justiciable in her opinion. Whether Justice O'Connor's concurrence can be
relied upon in future cases seems to depend on whether it is believed that the Texas
appellants made a successful case for incumbency protection as the predominant
consideration.
283. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1972-74 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
284. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The methodology used by
Justice Thomas is confusing, as he draws a line between forms of intent, finding that
intentional creations occur when "a majority-minority district is created 'because of' and
not merely 'in spite of,' racial demographics." Id. Oat 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
285. See id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He considers this position dicta and not
binding on himself or the Court. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. See id. at 2008 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's hypothesis is based on the
fact that party affiliation may not be an acceptable proxy for protecting race and the limit
to which race may be considered still has not been clearly defined. See id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). This point is key because in order for minorities to be elected, they must first
win a primary within their own party; thus, the presence of members of the candidate's own
party can be insufficient to aid a minority candidate if racial bloc voting exists within the
party.
287. See id. at 2007-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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respect (or lack of it) for political boundaries.' Thus, it is difficult
to conceive of a future case in which Justice O'Connor will find that
traditional criteria have not been subordinated to race.
Justice O'Connor's second guideline states that when racially
polarized voting exists, § 2 prohibits states from drawing districting
schemes "that would have the effect that minority voters 'have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to ... elect
representatives of their choice.' "" Her plurality opinion in Vera
indicates that states must demonstrate this effect by showing the
presence of the Gingles factors.' As with her first guideline, Justice
O'Connor supports her second guideline by referencing both the
plurality and the dissenting opinions.n Although not contradicted
directly, this position is not as secure as Justice O'Connor would
have it appear. Justice O'Connor's statement that § 2 prevents
districts that provide "less opportunity" to minority voters could be
referring to the principle of retrogression. However, in Vera, Shaw
II, and Miller, the Court narrowed the concept of retrogression in the
context of § 5, thereby limiting the enforcement arm of the statute,
particularly with regards to an ameliorative districting plan that
increases the percentage of minorities within a district. Justice
O'Connor's statement that § 2 prevents districts that provide "less
opportunity" for minority voters is at odds with this narrow
interpretation of § 5. If, however, "less opportunity" does not refer
to retrogression, then it is unclear exactly what voting infringement
Justice O'Connor is referencing.
In her third guideline, Justice O'Connor states that avoiding a
§ 2 violation is a compelling state interest.' Although a majority of
the current Justices probably agree with Justice O'Connor,' that fact
288. See id. at 1987 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, North Carolina has set its
own guidelines for contiguity, and recognizes point contiguity, while Texas has never
placed a priority on maintaining political boundaries. See id. at 1952.
289. Id. at 1969 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
290. Speaking for the Court, Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Stevens's and
Justice Souter's warnings that a legislature will have to draw the district that federal courts
would choose, arguing instead that a reasonably drawn district, subject to the state's
discretion, will be able to pass strict scrutiny. But she noted that "[s]trict scrutiny remains,
nonetheless, strict." Id. at 1961. This admonition is immediately followed by an
application of the Gingles preconditions to establish a "strong basis in evidence." Id.
291. See id. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
292. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that this decision interpreted only
the application of the Voting Rights Act and not its constitutionality); see also Vera, 116 S.
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could change with a change in the makeup of the Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist might hold that § 2 is not a compelling state
interest, and given the opportunity, Justices Scalia and Thomas
would likely declare the entire Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.'
Additionally, Justice O'Connor does not recognize a blanket § 2
defense, but instead qualifies this compelling state interest with the
requirement that the Gingles factors be present and that there be a
"strong basis in evidence" that the Gingles preconditions have been
satisfied.' Thus far, a "strong basis in evidence" has been defined
only in the negative. A generalized assumption does not provide a
"strong basis in evidence," even if the assumption is based on state
legislators' personal experience and knowledge of their districts and
communities; in addition, a "strong basis in evidence" cannot be
established with findings compiled after the initiation of litigation."
According to Justice O'Connor's fourth guideline, "if a State
pursues that compelling interest by creating a district that
'substantially addresses' the potential liability ... and does not
deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for
predominantly racial reasons, ... its districting plan will be deemed
narrowly tailored."'  Oddly, Justice O'Connor seems to be on the
most solid ground with her weakest point. This guideline is directly
in line with the Court's decision in Shaw II rejecting the generalized
remedy defense,' and with the decision in Vera that District 30 was
unacceptably altered because race was used as a proxy.' However,
Justice O'Connor's guideline includes the qualification that the
district must "not deviate substantially from a hypothetical court-
drawn § 2 district.""0 This qualification substantially weakens the
Ct. at 1998 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice O'Connor's separate opinion
reassures the viability of § 2); supra note 243 and accompanying text (reviewing the
previous opinions of the Justices on the status of § 2).
294. See John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial
Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L REV. 345,385 n.169, 423 (1995).
295. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
296. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also ida at 1986 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that state legislators are not allowed to rely on their own experience); Shaw
I, 116 S. Ct. at 1903 (denying credibility to North Carolina's evidence of racial
discrimination in voting dated 1994).
297. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
298. See Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1906.
299. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961.
300. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice
Souter noted in dissent that this is merely a foreshadowing of what may be the Court's
ultimate position and determination if it does not curb this judicial trend. See iU at 2008-
09 (Souter, J., dissenting). As yet, states have not been required to comply so closely with
a judicial interpretation. Such a conclusion portends that clear guidelines would be
1997] 2195
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statement on constitutional principle. Every Justice has agreed at
some point that the primary responsibility for drawing congressional
districts rests with states and their legislatures, °" yet Justice
O'Connor's guideline requires a state to second-guess successfully
the Court's supplementary role, and draw districts in accordance
with the Court's hypothetical preferences."
In her final guideline, Justice O'Connor reiterated that "districts
that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and that otherwise
neglect traditional districting principles and deviate substantially
from the hypothetical court-drawn district, for predominantly racial
reasons, are unconstitutional."' This guideline is subject to the
same criticism of forcing compliance with a hypothetical court-drawn
district. More important is the contrast between Justice O'Connor's
presentation of these factors and the actual application of the factors
by the Court. When presented by Justice O'Connor and laid out as
above, the accumulation of factors that must occur for a district to be
regarded as unconstitutional seems fairly substantial. In application,
though, these factors are combined and seem to fall together in a
domino-like effect. For example, if a district is bizarrely shaped it
will probably be non-compact. The Court's strong emphasis on
racial factors means that any non-compact majority-minority district
must have been accomplished by a subordination of traditional
districting principles, an action that the Court would not have
undertaken in a hypothetical Court-drawn plan. Therefore, the
district would be unconstitutional.
Justice O'Connor's point-by-point analysis seems to neglect the
manner in which each of these factors interrelates, and ignores their
established for states as to how and what factors the Court would consider, but the price
for such clarity is significant. Once established, states would not be able to deviate based
on any factor that would affect compactness, and state discretion would be severely
limited. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
301. See id at 1960 (plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justice Kennedy); id at 1998-99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (oined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer); iti at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488
(1995) (recognizing in a majority decision joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas that
reapportionment is the duty and responsibility of the state); cf. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507
U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (noting in a unanimous decision that redistricting is a domain of the
state, in a case involving state legislative apportionment).
302. Justice Kennedy rejected the narrow tailoring analysis that Justice O'Connor
suggested. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1972 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He would have held
that a second predominant-factor inquiry is unnecessary because if a race-based district
cannot be justified under § 2, it is not serving a compelling interest. See id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy rejected the intentional creation of a
majority-minority district or just the process for determining narrow tailoring.
303. Id. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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cumulative impact. Thus, Justice O'Connor's concurrence seems less
likely to reveal the requirements necessary to influence the Court. If
the Court applies these guidelines as general principles, rather than
as specific criteria, then Justice O'Connor's concurrence may be a
sufficient measuring tool for constitutionality. Loosely interpreted,
the guidelines Justice O'Connor suggested could be considered a
mission statement for the Voting Rights Act: Allow limited
flexibility in remedying racial discrimination, once clearly identified,
but bar race from becoming the predominant consideration of
legislatures in redistricting. Viewing the Voting Rights Act in this
limited manner may restrict its application, but may also preserve its
constitutionality. Unfortunately, until the Court decides its next
redistricting case, it is unclear whether the Court will apply a broad
or narrow lens to redistricting review.
Despite the unsettled nature of the law, the districting process
continues for state and local governments. Several procedural
changes are likely to occur as a result of the judicial pronouncements
in Shaw II and Vera. The most obvious procedural change is that in
order to provide a § 2 defense, state districting decision-makers must
clearly present the § 2 case at the outset of the process. Generalized
assumptions are insufficient and the state can protect itself only by
establishing a strong basis of evidence on which to rely. While this
preventive measure will add to the time and cost of the redistricting
process, it will cost less than trying to litigate in its absence."
However, the legislative process itself makes it difficult to establish a
body of evidence on which all of the legislators rely. The legislative
branch rarely, if ever, can be instructed as a whole on the statistical
factors present throughout the area. The substantive educational
process will have to occur at the committee level. Committee-level
education should be acceptable to the Court, as long as the general
body is provided with findings of fact, but the Court has not ruled
definitively on this point."°
A state or municipality also may protect itself by establishing at
the outset what criteria it considers relevant to redistricting decisions.
304. In 1993, North Carolina appropriated $500,000 for defense work in the Shaw
cases. See Capital Improvements Budget, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 561, § 6.
305. In different contexts, the Supreme Court has upheld legislative action by a
committee as acceptable to represent action by the body, so long as the action is not
judicial in nature. Compare Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 227 (1993) (accepting
impeachment trial by committee of Senate when transcripts but not full evidence were
made available to the full body), with INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding
that a congressional veto power exercised at the committee level in immigration
proceeding was unconstitutional).
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If it then abides by its own factors, it may contend fairly that it
applied traditional guidelines.M6  To be even more effective, this
listing should establish a hierarchy of criteria that does not include
race as a top priority.
A second procedural change after Shaw 11 and Vera is likely to
be an increased focus on the creation of "influence districts" rather
than majority-minority districts. Influence districts are districts that
include a substantial percentage, but not a majority, of minorities.
These districts also include groups of majority voters less likely to
engage in racial bloc voting, and who are more likely to be receptive
to coalition-building. There is no settled rule on the percentage of
minorities that must be present in a district in order to influence it;
generally, courts have considered influence districts to be districts in
which at least twenty-five percent of the voters belong to a minority
group. However, courts also have recognized that in close elections
substantially smaller groups may be influential.,"
In Gingles, the Supreme Court expressly left open the possibility
of influence districts. The Court noted that the standards it was
creating for a § 2 violation did not necessarily "pertain to[] a claim
brought by a minority group[] that is not sufficiently large and
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging
that the use of a multi-member district impairs its ability to influence
elections. '°8 In two recent decisions, Holder v. Halt' and Voinovich
v. Quilter,310 the Supreme Court expressly avoided answering the
306. See Hodgkiss, supra note 39, at 10-11.
307. The court in Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Councg Inc. v.
McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995), considered this
question extensively and advocated a standard rule that any district in which a minority
group composed 25% to 50% of the voting age population be considered an influence
district. See i& at 1104. While not ruling out the possibility that sinaller districts could be
influential, the Court found that the proof required for an influence district under these
circumstances would be difficult because the amount of influence would vary with each
close election. See id.
308. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,46-47 (1986) (emphasis added); see also Growe
v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993) (noting that Gingles left open the possibility of influence
dilution claims and that the viability of such districts was not addressed in this case either).
309. 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2596 (1994) (recognizing that the definition of what is an effective
vote may be further altered, particularly in light of the reserved question as to whether a
vote dilution claim may be brought for failure to create minority "influence" districts).
310. 507 U.S. 146 (1993). The plaintiffs in this case charged that Ohio's legislative
apportionment scheme "packed" minorities into minority and "super-majority" districts,
thereby diluting the more extensive voting strength they would have had if influence
districts had been created instead. See id. at 149-50. Justice O'Connor delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court. See iU at 148. The Court evaluated the plaintiffs' claim
while expressly reserving judgment on the question of whether an influence dilution claim
[Vol. 752198
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question of whether influence districts are constitutional. The
question generally has arisen in the context of determining whether
§ 2 requires the creation of an influence district where there is an
insufficient minority population to comprise a majority-minority
district. The circuits are split on the question and decisions have
taken three different directions. Most of the courts have applied the
Gingles factors strictly, finding that plaintiffs were unable to raise a
§ 2 claim because they could not meet the first precondition,
requiring that a minority group be large and compact enough to form
a majority in a single member district. 1' The decision in McNeil v.
Springfield Park Distric 12 was definitive in its rejection of the
influence-district claim. In McNeil, the Seventh Circuit argued that
the Supreme Court established three requirements for a § 2 claim
and that to recognize another claim based on "ability to influence"
would obliterate the Supreme Court's bright-line test.3" The McNeil
court warned that doing away with the bright-line test would flood
the courts with marginal § 2 claims that would be difficult to resolve
because the ability to influence an election is much harder to
existed under § 2. See id. at 154. Applying the Gingles factors, the Court found that white-
majority bloc voting sufficient to frustrate the election of minority choice candidates was
not established for a § 2 claim. Thus, it did not decide how the first Gingles condition
should be considered. See id. at 158.
311. See Latino Political Action Comm. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 415 (1st Cir.
1986). This case, involving "packing" of districts, was decided prior to Gingles. In denying
the claims of Hispanic voters, the court noted that the small Hispanic population was
spread throughout the city; thus, a claim was not present because rather than" 'cracking' a
cohesive Hispanic community the district lines merely fails [sic] to string together
dispersed pockets of Hispanic population to maximize its voting strength." Id. at 415
(citations omitted). Similarly, the Asian minority vote, comprising 2.69% of the
population, was found so small that its submergence was inevitable, but that in close
elections the minority group could have significant influence in swinging electoral
outcomes. See iU; see also Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634, 653 (N.D.
Il. 1991) (agreeing with other courts that the Voting Rights Act does not preclude
influence dilution claims, but finding that before identifying an injury and fashioning an
appropriate remedy, it was necessary to determine that the majority-of-minorities
precondition for a single-member district was met); Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista, 723 F.
Supp. 1384,1391 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (noting that until the Supreme Court expands § 2 claims
to influence districts, the District Court for the Southern District of California will not
recognize such claims based solely on a footnote in the Gingles opinion).
312. 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988).
313. Id. at 947. Judge Cudahy noted that the Supreme Court finally had enunciated a
clear standard in Gingles, which the Court had failed to do in prior decisions and which the
Senate had failed to do in its 1982 report. By affirming the district court's summary
judgment for the defendants in McNeil, Judge Cudahy prevented a full hearing on the
matter, the facts suggest that such a hearing would have shown that cohesive bloc voting
did not exist to bar the election of a candidate chosen by the African-American
community. See J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the
Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L REV. 551, 570-71 (1993).
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establish than the ability to win an election.14 Interestingly, the
minority population in McNeil comprised forty-three percent of the
voting age population. Thus, the crossover voting necessary to win
an election was minimal. If the court had applied the Gingles factors
as a unitary test, which it claimed to do, the court likely would have
affirmed the validity of influence district claims and would have
found sufficient evidence to entertain the plaintiff's claim.
315
Garza v. County of Los Angeles " took a second direction. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
holding that the Gingles factors apply when plaintiffs seek to
establish a § 2 claim based on disparate impact.3 7  However, when
plaintiffs can present evidence of disparate intent in the drawing of
the districts, establishment of the Gingles factors is presumed.1
Thus, under Garza, plaintiffs must establish the three preconditions
only when a claim rests on the disparate impact of a facially neutral
electoral scheme. The court rejected the county's argument that it
was acceptable to dilute Hispanic votes in order to protect Anglo
314. See McNeil, 851 F.2d at 947. This portion of the McNeil opinion has been most
often cited in later decisions, noting the general concern over a flood of difficult claims
with little evidentiary support. Judge Cudahy supported his reliance on the bright-line test
with Justice O'Connor's concurrence to the Gingles opinion. See id. However, Justice
O'Connor's opinion expressly adopted no view as to whether it should be a threshold
requirement for a minority group to show the ability to constitute a minority in a single-
member district. Instead, she noted that the difference between the "ability to influence"
and the "ability to elect" is a fine line, and groups not large enough to form a majority in a
district still may be able to demonstrate sufficient voting strength to elect candidates of
their choice. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 90 (1986) (O'Connor, concurring in
the judgment). Indeed, in Voinovich, in considering an influence dilution claim arguendo,
the Court's opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, noted that the first Gingles
precondition would have to be modified or eliminated in this context. See Voinovich, 507
U.S. at 158. Because the claim was dismissed on other grounds, the Court did not give
significant consideration to this point, but it also did not appear concerned with the effect
of such a change.
Since the McNeil decision, the Supreme Court appears to have opened up the
floddgates of litigation with the Shaw decision. The presence of so many claims in which
no clearly defined injury has been established adds credence to Judge Cudahy's concern
that the § 2 cases be clearly decided ta prevent every district from being challenged as a
Voting Rights violation.
315. See Kousser, supra note 313, at 571. The second precondition-cohesiveness of
the minority group-is presumably present; moreover, the third precondition-racial bloc
voting-supports the plaintiffs' claim and influence districts as a whole. Based on school-
board elections, the minority-choice candidate also would be able to win an election at
times with a minimum of crossover support. See i.
316. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
317. See i. at 770. Disparate impact occurs when statutes or ordinances are facially
neutral, but have a disparate effect due to their administration or other factors.
318. See id.
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incumbents in the absence of a sufficient majority of minorities.3 9
The court held that once evidence of intent was found, only some
evidence of injury was necessary to establish that a "meaningful
remedy" could be imposed.320
The third and final judicial position with respect to influence
districts, which only one court has recognized, is that such districts
may be required under § 2. In Armour v. Ohio,32' a three judge panel
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
rejected an application of the Gingles preconditions in all
circumstances and instead applied a "totality of the circumstances"
review derived from § 2(b)?in Ohio adopted a redistricting plan that
called for drawing majority-minority districts wherever possible. If,
however, a minority concentration was insufficient to constitute a
majority in a district, it was disregarded .3" As a result of this policy,
the community of Youngstown, Ohio was split between two districts
so that the community comprised twenty-five percent of one district
and eleven percent of the second district. The plaintiffs argued that
an alternative district with a thirty-six percent minority population
and containing ninety-nine percent of the minority communities
319. See id. at 769. HIstorically, the Hispanic voting population had been fragmented
in order to dilute the vote and protect incumbents. At the time the districts in question
were drawn, it was possible to have created one of the five districts with a majority of
Hispanic voters using data as of 1988 projections. See id. The trial in district court ran
three months and consisted of extensive statistical data presented by expert witnesses as to
whether a 48% or 52% Hispanic district could be created based on projections from 1980
data. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that a district with a majority
of voting-age Latinos could have been drawn. Even if this could not be established,
enough cross-over voting had been established that a nearly-50% district would be
effective in electing a candidate of choice from the Latino community. Finally, even if
these determinations were disputable, redistricting had discriminated against the Latinos
in the past, establishing a violation of the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court decision but
focused entirely on discriminatory intent, thereby avoiding the statistical mire created by
the two possible discriminatory effect definitions. See id. at 771; Kousser, supra note 313,
at 571-73.
320. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 771; Kousser, supra note 313, at 572-73.
321. 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
322. See id. at 1053-58. "A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election... are not equally open to participation ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1994) (emphasis added); see also Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council, Inc. v.
McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096,1101-02 (W.D. Tenn.) (stating that the underlying purpose
of a "totality of the circumstances" test is to decide whether a legislature's voluntary
creation of an influence district may be counted as a factor in determining whether a § 2
violation is present), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995). If this is the case, conversely, influence
districts may be recognized as a defensive strategy for states.
323. See Annour, 775 F. Supp. at 1061; Kousser, supra note 313, at 573-74.
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could have been drawn, and that splitting the community limited the
ability of minorities to influence elections. 24 Following an extensive
review of the circumstances, including the history of racism in the
area, discrimination in electoral politics, effects of discrimination,
racial polarization and political cohesiveness, and the responsiveness
of elected officials, the district court agreed that the voters of this
African-American community were deprived of their opportunity to
elect a candidate of their choice."f
However, while ruling that an influence district should be drawn
under these circumstances, the court also noted that its decision
could have detrimental effects. Drawing an influence district will aid
the minority community in electing a candidate of its choice;
however, it will not necessarily aid African-American voters in
electing a candidate of their own race.' This result is perfectly
acceptable under § 2, which expressly notes that no group is
guaranteed proportional representation." However, many
advocates view redistricting as a means of increasing the number of
minority representatives, and influence districts may not assist in this
goal."2 Even majority-minority districts do not guarantee success to
minority candidates. The fact that most majority-minority districts
have elected minority representatives fosters this perception of
guaranteed success." Influence districts may successfully provide
greater support for minority concerns, but they will not necessarily
324. See Armour, 775 F. Supp. at 1047-48; Kousser, supra note 313, at 573-74.
325. See Armour, 775 F. Supp. at 1053-58.
326. See id. at 1059-60.
327. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) ("JN]othing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.").
328. See GROFMANETAL., supra note 50, at 117. Grofman and his co-authors strongly
disagree with the position taken by the court in Armour, noting that judicial challenge of
influence districts could present difficulties as great as those involved with § 2 claims prior
to the establishment of the Gingles criteria. See id. They argue:
If minorities have no opportunity to elect one of their own and they would be apt
to do so if given the choice, it is paternalistic to say that they should be content
with their supposed opportunity to influence elections of white
representatives.... [Mf one claims that increasing the number of black voters in a
district ipso facto increases their influence, then it would seem to follow that the
influence of black voters is reduced in those districts from which black voters are
removed. When there are "electibility" claims at issue, there is a natural
threshold.
Id. at 117-18.
329. See Stanley Pierre-Louis, Comment, The Politics of Influence: Recognizing




increase minority presence. This is particularly true where one
political party predominates in the district. In a single-party district,
the presence of racial bloc voting may prevent a minority candidate
from gaining a majority of the votes. In the general election, the
candidate will need to be responsive to all sizable constituency
groups, but in the primary, the candidate can focus on specific
constituencies.
Although the focus of the Voting Rights Act is protecting the
right to vote, many people consider representation by minorities to
be equally important. Minority representation provides a visible
image of minority voting success. In addition, elected officials who
are minorities can support the minority community by providing role
models to future legislators and familiar faces to constituents seeking
to work with government. Admittedly, these benefits are often
intangible, but they historically have been considered very real to the
minority community.3
At least one court has recognized that influence districts may be
a useful compromise that allows vote dilution claims to proceed, but
that avoids the creation of an entitlement to proportional
representation.3 While the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit did not mandate the creation of a minority influence
district on remand in Uno v. City of Holyoke,72 it required a district
court to consider the opportunity for an influence district. The
Hispanic population comprised thirty-one percent of the city of
Holyoke.33 The court's holding required the district court to
determine whether the Hispanic population's voting strength was
diluted.3 That determination involved considering whether the
Hispanic population possibly could form an influence district. 35
However, the court obviously supported the creation of influence
districts as a means of lessening the "balkanization" of electoral
330. See ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AfFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 239-40 (1987) (finding that office holding by minorities
heightens confidence in minority political competence); cf. Remarks of Deval Patrick,
supra note 1 (noting that minority representatives provide more than "symbolic
significance" because they also improve "the whole business and public integrity of
governing"). But cf. Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1903 n.5 (noting the Supreme Court has
previously not found promoting role models for students to be a compelling interest).
331. See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973,991 (1st Cir. 1995).
332. See id. This action was brought by a group of Hispanic voters challenging
Holyoke's alderman election system under the Voting Rights Act. See id. at 977.
333. See id. at 978.
334. See id. at 990.
335. See id.
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districts along racial lines 3"
In a footnote, the Uno court recognized what may be the
greatest remaining stumbling block to effective influence districts: an
influence district offers a true opportunity for minority involvement.
in the electoral process only if it includes sufficient crossover voters
willing to join with the minority group in electing representatives of
their own choice.3 7 This alludes to the second problem with
recognizing influence districts: the third Gingles precondition
requires proof that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it ... to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 38 In
order to create an effective influence district, the minority population
would have to be grouped with sympathetic majority voters. This
group, by definition, would be unlikely to engage in the majority
bloc voting required for a § 2 violation. Thus, it appears that
although influence districts are useful in bridging the gaps inherent
to voting rights litigation, they can be created based only on a
"totality of the circumstances" review, not under a claim based on
the Gingles preconditions.3
For influence districts to be utilized effectively, the districting
336. See id. at 991 ("Influence districts, on the other hand, are to be prized as a means
of encouraging both voters and candidates to dismantle the barriers that wall off racial
groups and replace those barriers with voting coalitions."). In Rural West Tennessee
African-American Affairs Counci Inc. v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn),
aft'd, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995), the three-judge district court panel assessed the legislative
history surrounding the 1982 amendment to § 2, particularly the proportionality provision.
See id. at 1104. The 1982 amendments to § 2 included an important compromise:
"Provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)
(1994). This phrase, known as the "Dole Compromise," was added to make it clear that
the addition of a results standard did not add a proportionality requirement as well. See
supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Although there was considerable debate on
whether this phrase was necessary, the general consensus was that proportionality was not
required. See Rural W. Tenn., 877 F. Supp. at 1104.
337. See Uno, 72 F.3d at 991 n.13. Once elected, the representatives also must be
responsive to the needs of the minority voters as well as the majority population for a
minority influence district to have a true effect on the community. See id.
338. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,51 (1986).
339. No court has specifically ruled on the conflict between influence districts and this
third precondition. The fact that courts have expressed concern about the first
precondition and not this one may indicate either that it will be ignored in the analysis, or
that while some evidence of majority bloc voting must be found to exist, it need not exist
within the influence district as drawn. This second interpretation is unlikely based on the
Supreme Court's criticism of North Carolina's view that the presence of a § 2 violation
allowed a remedial majority-minority district to be drawn anywhere within the state. See
Shaw I, 116 S. Ct. at 1906; Transcript of Oral Argument, Shaw II (No. 94-923, 94-924),
available in 1995 WL 729891, *44-*46.
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body must accept two factors that differentiate influence districts
from majority-minority districts. First, establishing or requiring
influence districts blurs the bright-line test established by the Court
in Gingles.' Thus, establishing an influence dilution claim may be
even more difficult than establishing the already difficult vote
dilution claim. There is also the risk that redistricting committees,
judges, or other parties may decide that influence districts are
"better" for minorities than majority-minority districts, thereby
failing to create reasonable majority-minority districts." However,
the controversy currently surrounding vote dilution claims
emphasizes that, even with a bright-line test, the constitutionality of
districts is a difficult determination. Second, influence districts may
give minorities false hope of electing minority candidates. z'
Influence districts allow minority voters to have a significant impact
on the final vote; however, the minority community's vote may be
split in a primary, allowing a non-minority candidate to proceed to
the general election. Historically, civil rights groups have not
advocated influence districts because sufficient majority bloc voting
typically existed to overcome the minority influence. 3 However, in
340. See GROFMANEIrAL., supra note 50, at 117.
341. See Kousser, supra note 313, at 587-89. A bright-line rule does not guarantee that
all minorities will be given proper consideration by the courts. In some courts, the Gingles
factors have been interpreted to develop formalistic criteria for judicial relief, in effect
creating a "catch-22" under which the ability to succeed in electing minority-preferred
candidates must be proven before relief will be granted, but success is not possible until
the relief is granted. See id, at 588. Additionally, some commentators have argued that a
bright-line test is not appropriate for consideration of Voting Rights Act cases at all.
Rather, certain factors may be considered as guidelines, but the ultimate determination of
a violation should rely on an assessment of the "totality of the circumstances." Under this
argument, a test serves merely to aid judicial administration of election claims, but
undermines the court's duty imposed by Congress to assess whether the plaintiffs have
suffered a remedial injury. See, e.g., Beth A. Levene, Comment, Influence-Dilution Claims
Under the Voting Rights Act, 1995 U. CI. LEGALF. 457,470-71.
A parallel argument is that while majority-minority districts aid those groups of the
minority population centrally located and sufficient to constitute a district, small clusters
of minorities deserve protection as much as large groups. See Kousser, supra note 313, at
586. This point is particularly appropriate in North Carolina and similarly situated states
where the minority population, although significant in number, is not concentrated in one
area. If a colorblind society is the goal, increasing the dispersion of minorities and
majorities throughout the community would seem to go hand in hand. If, however,
minorities who do not live within the "minority area" are penalized by less electoral
influence, then there is no incentive for this integration.
342. See Pierre-Louis, supra note 329, at 1226-27. While the creation of a majority-
minority district almost always results in the election of a minority representative,
influence districts do not yield the same results. See id. at 1227-28.
343. See id. at 1227 n.54 ("'We didn't have much respect for influence districts. We
thought that was a misnomer, really, a kind of phantom that does not yield real political
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recent elections, majority voters have begun greater crossover voting
and communities' ethnicities have become increasingly mixed.-"
Candidates have, in turn, become more dependent on and interested
in courting the minority vote. In addition, a minority community
may receive greater support from numerous representatives elected
from a greater number of minority influence districts than from a
single elected minority representative from a majority-minority
district. Thus, where three influence districts are created rather than
one or two majority-minority districts, there will be three elected
representatives responsive to their minority constituency, thereby
increasing the number of votes on minority-supported issues.m5 If
these results are acceptable, it is evident that influence districts offer
dispersed minority groups, such as those present in North Carolina,
an excellent opportunity to elect representatives of their choice, if
not their race. In drawing new congressional districts, the North
Carolina legislature should strongly consider the possibility of
drawing additional influence districts instead of strict majority-
minority districts only.
Whether intentionally or by default, another possible trend is an
abdication of authority by the legislature to allow either courts, a
commission of experts, or experts appointed by a court to design
districts. While court-drawn districts are controversial, they can
already be found in many areas.' The second alternative is districts
drawn by a panel of experts. Under this system, a bipartisan or
nonpartisan committee is established to study and propose a
congressional apportionment plan, which is then submitted to the
influence or build political power in the state."' (quoting Nelson Rivers, President of the
South Carolina Chapter of the NAACP), quoted in Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329,
1355 n.47 (D.S.C. 1992)).
344. See i. at 1228-29. By courting the minority vote and other disenfranchised
members of the populace, representatives from the Sixth District of South Carolina and
the Fifth District of Missouri have been able to win elections without a majority of support
from the white population. These representatives have been able to cultivate the support
of the minority community by being attentive to its needs, but are not necessarily members
of the community themselves. See id.
345. Rural West Tennessee African-American Affairs Council Inc. v. McWherter, 877
F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 42 (1995), provides anecdotal evidence of this
type of situation. In this case, involving state legislative districts, testimony of two white
senators representing districts with an influential minority population was recounted.
Senator Stephen Cohen cited the effectiveness of influence districts on the legislative
proposal to make Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday a state holiday, a measure that passed
by one vote. If a majority-minority district had been created instead, another conservative
white senator would have been elected rather than a senator responsive to an influential
minority community, therefore, the measure may have failed. See id. at 1106.
346. See supra note 202 for a discussion of the court-drawn maps in Georgia.
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state legislature for a vote.)7 The legislature may either accept or
reject the plan, but may not alter it.' This system has gained
support from a variety of sources. In 1995, New Jersey voters
amended their state constitution to create a permanent, bipartisan
Redistricting Commission at the beginning of each decade 49 This
amendment succeeded, in part, because of the controversy
surrounding the state's previous two attempts to redraw districts."
Dan Morales, Attorney General for the State of Texas, and
Robinson Everett, the plaintiffs' attorney in Shaw I and II, have
advocated similar plans in the interest of removing partisan politics
from the redistricting process. 51 In effect, these attorneys represent
support for redistricting commissions on both sides of the courtroom.
In addition, nonpartisan groups such as the League of Women
Voters and Common Cause352 have endorsed this system. However,
the creation of a commission may not necessarily overcome the
political process. For instance, any commission would be staffed by
political appointees, thus perpetuating partisanship and special-
interest influence over the panel. The third possibility, districts
347. See Common Cause Issue: Reapportionment and Redistricting (visited Jan. 7,1997)
<http://www.ccsi.com/-comcause/position/pp-ri.html>.
348. See iU.
349. See Associated Press, USA TODAY (visited Jan. 7, 1997) <http://www.
usatoday.con/news/washdc/elect/states/newjerse/n95nj021.htm>.
350. See id.
351. See Dan Morales, Time for Texas to Change It's [sic] Ways, TEX. ISPANIC MAG.
(Aug. 1995) <http'J/www.txhisp.com/aug_95/morales.html>. "Members of the commission
could include, not only members of both parties, but also legal and demographic experts
well versed in the complexities of redistricting. This commission, detached from the need
to preserve political careers, could make independent decisions on behalf of the public
interest, not partisan interests." Id. Robinson Everett, in conversations with the author
and in numerous public discussions, has advocated that a panel of experts be appointed to
redraw North Carolina's districts. Professor Everett argues that the districts should be
drawn without regard to race or partisan interests. Interview with Robinson 0. Everett,
Professor of Law at Duke University in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 22,1996).
352. The Common Cause plan is well-delineated and provides an easy illustration of
factors such a system would take into consideration. Under the model, legitimate partisan
interests are provided for by the appointment of two commissioners from each major
party, plus the election of a fifth member by the party-appointed members, to serve as the
commission's chair. To be eligible for commission membership, individuals would not be
permitted to have held office within two years prior to selection, or within four years after
the effective date of the plan. They would also be prohibited from holding office in a
political party or working as a registered lobbyist within a certain time frame surrounding
the commission's work. Specific standards and guidelines would then be established for
the commission's use in drawing a new plan. See Common Cause Issue: Reapportionment
and Redistricting, supra note 347; cf. Martin Dyckman, Editorial, Let's End the Chaos, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at 27A (advocating redistricting by a nonpartisan
commission, rather than by the legislature).
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drawn by special masters appointed by courts, has been used in
special situations, but these districts are not immune to challenge.3'
In the wake of Shaw II and Vera, one trend that is likely to
continue despite the Court's disapproval is the increasing role of
technology in the districting process.' While mapmakers have had
access to racial information at the census bloc level since 1980,
improving technology has allowed mapmakers to employ it
effectively only since 1990. Prior to computers, district maps were
drawn with magic markers and crayons. 55 Now, computers allow a
mapmaker to sit at a display terminal with the state map, create a
district, and receive a profile of the area, including population, race,
political affiliation, and past voting history. 6 With each change of
the map, the data are retabulated, allowing mapmakers to be fully
aware of the effects of any changes.' The database behind this
technology is composed primarily of information from two sources:
basic demographic data from the Census Bureau and political
information from the county elections bureau." Information from
the Census Bureau is broken down into census blocks, generally
comprising about a dozen houses.5 County board of elections
information is normally limited to wards or precincts, a larger area
than the census block .3  Thus, racial information is available at a
353. In California, a breakdown in the legislative process allowed thie state supreme
court to intervene. See Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. 1992). When Governor
Wilson vetoed the California legislature's reapportionment plan in September 1991, "the
California Supreme Court issued a mandate and appointed three retired California judges
to serve as Special Masters to resolve the election year crisis." DeWitt v. Wilson, 856
F. Supp. 1409,1410 (E.D. Cal.), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2637 (1994). The Masters held a series of
public hearings and reviewed 22 proposed plans. They ultimately rejected every proposed
plan as in conflict with the guidelines and considerations established by the state supreme
court for redistricting. The Masters then drew their own redistricting plan, which was
approved by the California Supreme Court. See i& at 1411. The plan was challenged by a
group of voters and upheld by a panel of three district court judges. See id. at 1410. On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment without opinion. See DeWitt v. Wilson,
115 S. Ct. 2637 (1994) (mem.).
354. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1953. The Supreme Court used the Texas redistricting
computer program, REDAPPL as evidence that race received undue consideration in the
redistricting process, based on the presence of this redistricting tool. See id.





360. See id When this information is assimilated to form the database, some
interpretation of the data is required because the boundaries of each district are not
necessarily identical. However, for the 2000 census, the states and Census Bureau are
working together to create more consistent boundaries, thereby increasing the accuracy
2208 [V/ol. 75
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much finer level than current political data provide.361  This
information allows mapmakers to discern not only whether a district
is black or white, and Republican or Democrat, but also whether it is
likely to be influenced politically by social issues or will tend to vote
a straight-party ticket. While the Supreme Court disapproves of
using this detailed information in drawing districts, the Court's
adherence to the standard of population equality encourages state
legislatures to use these programs to create districts nearly equal in
population. 6 It is unrealistic to encourage legislatures to take
advantage of the technological innovations in one area, but
command them to ignore the technology in another area. Further,
due to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, the racial
information must be considered at some point.3  Both the
technology and information available have improved greatly in the
last five years, and regardless of the Court's disapproval, state
legislatures will continue to use the information to their advantage.
The most drastic changes in voting may be at the state and local
level. By altering the election system from single representative to
multi-representative districts,3" and by applying new methods of
tabulation, some jurisdictions may remove the burden of redistricting
altogether. Civil rights advocates are strongly in favor of programs
such as limited voting,"6 cumulative voting,'g preference voting, 67
and accessibility of the information. See id.
361. North Carolina's redistricting program, currently in use, not only allows access to
information about voters' race, but also includes precinct reports from three previous
statewide elections. The three elections currently compared are the 1990 U.S. Senate race,
1988 Lieutenant Governor race, and 1988 Court of Appeals race. See Memorandum to
Senate Select Committee on Redistricting & House Committee on Congressional
Redistricting, for House Bill 586, Mar. 26,1997, at 28 [hereinafter Memorandum].
362. In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court invalidated a New Jersey
redistricting plan in which the maximum deviation between districts was only 0.6984%,
and the average deviation was 726 people from the ideal population of 526,059. See id. at
728, 744. Further, the Court refused to set a de ninimis level of population inequality,
believing the state legislatures would strive to achieve the de minimis level, rather than
absolute equality. See id. at 731. Instead, it interpreted the Constitution to permit "only
the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to
achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown." Id. at 730 (citation
omitted).
363. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (establishing a § 2 violation when a protected class is
denied equal opportunity to participate in elections); id. § 1973c (establishing a § 5
violation when a voting change results in less electoral opportunity based on race or color).
364. These methods involve candidates running for election across the jurisdiction,
rather than in a specific territorial portion. See Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue,
Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 241, 251.
365. Limited voting is based on the principle of representational government and the
idea that a group comprising only 51% of the constituency should not be allowed to control
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and combined forms. The alternative voting methods provide the
same result as race-conscious districting and minority representation
by minorities, but do so without the divisive line-drawing process."
These options are not available for congressional districts, however,
as a federal statute requires representatives to be elected from single
representative districts. 69  The difficulty present in redistricting
probably has not reached the level necessary for a statutory change,
especially a change allowing a process as complicated as these forms
of multi-representative districts require.
Through this analysis and application it appears that although
the standards of the Supreme Court are not clearly defined, new
congressional districts can be formed that satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution. The Voting Rights Act was created by Congress in
order to protect and equally apply the right to vote. However, the
effect of this Act is unclear when applied to congressional
redistricting plans created by states that provide greater minority
opportunity than minimally required. Within the past seven years
the Supreme Court reviewed five important cases-Shaw v. Reno
the entire governmental body merely because of its majority status. It works by allotting
voters fewer votes than the number of seats available-i.e., a voter may be allowed to vote
for two candidates when there are five positions available. By limiting each voter to two
votes, the same majority is prevented from controlling all five seats. A well-organized
minority group is then able to control at least one seat, provided it is sufficiently large. In
the current hypothetical, a minority group would need to comprise approximately 28% or
more of the voting pool effectively to control one seat. See id at 252-53.
366. Under cumulative voting, voters are allotted as many votes as there are seats
available. The voter may choose to use all of her votes for one candidate, split them
among five different candidates, or divide them in some other manner. Minority groups
may concentrate all of their votes on one candidate, if they have a strong preference. The
same majority is then prevented from controlling all five seats. In a five-seat election, a
cohesive minority group, comprising only one-sixth of the voting population, could then
control one of the five seats. See id.
367. Preference voting is the most complicated method. Each voter is given one ballot
for the number of candidates running. The voter then ranks the candidates, but is not
required to rank all of the candidates. When the votes are tabulated, any "wasted"
votes-votes without which a candidate would still win, or votes with which a candidate
could not possibly win-are transferred to the voter's next preferred candidate. The vote
transfer process is difficult to explain, and this complexity poses the greatest barrier to
acceptance of this method, particularly because of the priority placed on easily
understandable voting rules in our society. See id.
368. See id at 255. Like territorial districts, alternative voting systems have side
effects as well. They may allow extremist fringe groups a greater opportunity for
representation, slow the democratic process with deadlock, and increase the costs of
candidates by requiring campaigning in a larger area. See id. at 256-57.
369. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994); see also Richard L Hasen, "High Court Wrongly
Elected':" A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1336-37 (1997) (advocating new voting systems and their use with
the Voting Rights Act).
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(Shaw 1), Johnson v. DeGrandy, Miller v. Johnson, Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw II), and Bush v. Vera-that rapidly developed the judicial
precedent in this area. Theoretically, these cases should have built
upon each other to develop a clear line of precedent. That has not
occurred. Instead, the Court has yet to define clearly the
constitutional injury underlying this cause of action, or to explain
what actions states may take without violating the Constitution.
Shaw II and Vera continue this path into jurisprudential
wilderness." In both cases, the Court continued to avoid making a
clear statement of the injury. However, the Court's analyses in those
cases may provide some indication of what activity crosses the
boundaries and becomes unconstitutional. Essentially, if a state does
not base redistricting predominantly on race, justifies any majority-
minority districts by information establishing a possible § 2 claim
under the Voting Rights Act, and does not rely on § 5 to create a
new majority-minority district, the state safely may create a
congressional districting plan with majority-minority districts.
As a result of the difficult and expensive situation states are
currently in, those states subject to § 5 preclearance requirements
may move to find alternative solutions. States subject to § 5
preclearance are encountering the majority of difficulties.37 These
states may elect to continue redistricting, but may use influence
districts as a middle ground between unconstitutional use of race and
the preclearance requirement that minorities be represented fairly
and be capable of electing representatives of their choice.
Structurally, states may choose to create districts through
redistricting committees that remove politics from the process, may
choose to use influence districts that avoid strict scrutiny, or may
choose to advocate changes in the federal law that eliminate single
representative congressional districts.
In the future, this tension will continue; districting plans, and
indeed the very constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act itself, hang
in the balance. The heart of this tension is the conflict between the
Justice Department's desire to ensure that legislative bodies are
racially representative of their constituencies, and the Supreme
Court's desire to ensure a colorblind society. Resolution of this
conflict ultimately depends upon interpretation of the primary goal
370. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
371. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (requiring approval for changes in districts covered
under § 5 either by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or by the
United States Attorney General).
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APPENDIX A: THE HAMMOND CONGRESSIONAL PLAN"
Very little congressional redistricting has occurred since the
Supreme Court guidelines established in Shaw 11 and Vera. In
Texas, a federal district court ordered the congressional districts
redrawn prior to the November 1996 elections. After finding the
districts unconstitutional, the court chose not to delay creating new
districts until the next election. This decision resulted in judicially
drawn districts.73 The March primary results were thrown out, and
all the candidates were placed on the November 5th ballot. Because
none of the candidates in the three districts won by a majority of the
vote, a special run-off election in December was required.374
In North Carolina, a federal district court allowed the
challenged districts to remain in place for the 1996 elections and
ordered new plans to be submitted to the three-judge panel by April
1, 1997. This decision left the North Carolina legislature with the
task of configuring districts acceptable to the district court. The
North Carolina legislature chose to create a new congressional plan
because the legislators clearly viewed redistricting as their
responsibility and duty.75 Of course, the creation of the new plan
was not accomplished with ease, and involved significant political
compromise. The plan proposed by the legislature is analyzed in
Appendix B based on considerations developed from Shaw 11 and
Vera.
Prior to the state legislature's redistricting attempt, the author
372. M. Elaine Hammond is a research assistant for Senator Marc Basnight, President
Pro Tempore of the N.C. Senate. She created the Hammond Congressional Plan using the
North Carolina Legislative Drafting System. This system, containing a computerized
database with census and elections data, is available to the general public. The legislative
staff provides assistance in accessing the system and drawing districts. The author greatly
appreciates the technical support of Dan Frey and Mike Michael in drawing the plan. In
addition, Gerry Cohen, director of legislative drafting, provided his expertise in fine-
tuning the Hammond Plan to reach its objectives. The figures included in the appendix are
drawn from a printout of the plan, which is available on the legislative drafting computer.
A full printout is also on file with the author.
373. See Vera v. Richards, 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1342 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that the
state legislature's failure to create new districts warranted judicial intervention).
374. See Michael Graczyk, GOP Freshman Congressman Loses in Special Texas
Runoff, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 11, 1996, at AS.
375. Following the Supreme Court decision in Shaw H1, both the North Carolina House
and Senate appointed committees to advise the state Attorney General's office on whether
a new plan could be created in time for the November 1996 elections and to begin
considering possible redistricting plans. In addition, the House Rules Committee
presented an alternative plan to the public during the legislative session, but it was never
voted on. H-B. 72,141st. Leg., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 1996).
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attempted to formulate a new congressional districting plan for
North Carolina. The goal of this exercise was to take the theories
extrapolated from the Supreme Court opinions in Shaw II and Vera
and apply them to the actual facts and figures with which North
Carolina's legislators would be required to work in the redistricting
process. A map of the Hammond Congressional Plan is included.
Following is a step-by-step discussion of the process and the map
that resulted.
First, in order to protect against a § 2 claim, the criteria and
considerations in the process were established at the outset. Based
on the Court's opinions, the following factors were applied: a focus
on relatively compact districts, incumbency protection, maintenance
of communities of interests, respect for county and voting precinct
boundaries wherever possible, and nonretrogression of minority
electoral achievements. Several things should be noted about these
factors.
Shape: Justice O'Connor is the Justice primarily concerned with
shape, and her opinions on this factor have ranged from considering
shape a determinative factor,3 7 to finding shape irrelevant,3" to
determining that shape is a consideration. 8 In light of this variance,
the goal of this plan was to create districts reasonably compact, but
to balance the interests in an "attractive district" with the other
competing considerations-in effect, to keep shape from being the
predominant consideration. In so doing, it is important to note that
boundaries which may follow North Carolina's county and voting
precinct lines will not necessarily be regular in appearance.
Generally, districts are very abstractly shaped and boundaries curve
and bend around everything from cities to natural land formations.
Unlike some areas of the country, particularly the Midwest,
"compact" in North Carolina does not necessarily mean "regularly
shaped."
Incumbency protection: Lines were drawn to keep incumbents
within their districts wherever possible 9 Although the population
376. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Shaw 1) ("[W]e believe that
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.").
377. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2488 (1995) ("[P]arties alleging that a State
has assigned voters on the basis of race are neither confined in their proof to evidence
regarding the district's geometry and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing of
bizarreness.").
378. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1953 ("We do not hold that any one of these factors is
independently sufficient to require strict scrutiny. The Constitution does not mandate
regularity of district shape .... ).
379. Congressional representatives are not required to reside within their district. In
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statistics are the same as those used in 1990, several of the
incumbents have changed. The most significant change is that two of
the current incumbents are minorities who theoretically should
receive the same protection as the other incumbents. 1 If racial bloc
voting is a factor in their districts, race should be considered in this
determination. In Vera, the Court placed its greatest restriction thus
far on incumbency protection, strongly admonishing Texas that
incumbency protection does not mean incumbents may choose their
electorate.l Therefore, while districts in this proposed plan were
neither taken away from incumbents nor shifted significantly in party
affiliation, they were not tailored to meet the specific appeals of
candidates.3
Communities Of Interest: Wherever possible, districts have been
created with unifying characteristics. Most commonly this means
grouping urban areas such as the Research Triangle Park into one
district and keeping rural areas in similarly rural districts.3
Similarly, county lines have been maintained when possible. The
plan presented does not have any split precincts; however, it
currently has a population variance from the ideal ranging from
-0.11% to 0.15%, or 1450 people. By law, congressional districts
must be drawn to be exactly equal;' therefore, if this plan were
applied, voting precincts would have to be split to reach the exact
number of voters.Y
North Carolina, two current representatives live outside their districts: Sue Myrick (9th
District) and Walter Jones (3rd District). Drawing any plan in which all the
representatives live within their districts is almost impossible with the current incumbents
because two of the representatives, Sue Myrick (9th District) and Mel Watt (12th
District), reside within the same voting precinct. However, all the incumbents remain in
their current districts and retain significant portions of their constituencies. The plan does
not place the incumbent representatives in conflict with each other.
380. The 1990 census results are used, as well as electoral information from 1988 and
1990.
381. See supra notes 193, 286-87 and accompanying text. Because one representative,
Mel Watt, was elected from an unconstitutional district, the level of protection he should
receive is questionable. Since the other majority-minority district was not declared
unconstitutional, the incumbency protection provided to that district's representative
should be identical to that other incumbents receive.
382. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1954, 1959-60.
383. Admittedly, this is a much easier task when the candidates are unaware the plan is
even being drawn.
384. Due to the great variance in population between urban and rural areas, the
districts may not appear to be equally drawn, although the population variance is limited.
385. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983); see also supra note 362
(reviewing the Supreme Court's holding in Karcher).
386. The reality is that, for exact equality, any plan will require some splitting of
precincts because although the districts are required to be equal, precincts are of varying
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As the attached map indicates, this plan follows the general
layout of the current congressional plan, but is substantially more
compact and less divisive. Only eighteen counties have been split,
and no county is split between more than two districts, as opposed to
the current plan in which District 12 splits ten counties, five of which
are cut into three different districts. Politically, four districts could
be considered Democratic districts, three to four could be considered
Republican districts, and three to four could be considered swing
districts based on election results."s
The most significant difference in this plan is the absence of
majority-minority districts. There are no true majority-minority
districts in the Hammond Congressional Plan because of the inability
to create a relatively compact district with greater than 50% minority
representation." Instead, to maintain minority representation, the
plan relies on minority influence districts. Admittedly, this is a risky
move. If this plan were submitted to the Justice Department for
preclearance, it is unclear whether the department would consider
influence districts a justifiable way of maintaining the current level of
minority representation. Furthermore, influence districts do not
guarantee the election of minority representatives, but merely
provide an opportunity for the election of the minority choice
candidate. The effectual difference is a result of the primary system.
If a district is overwhelmingly Democratic, as is the case in District 1,
the minority candidate must be able to win a primary with only the
minority vote. In a general election, many people may vote along
party lines regardless of race, but in a primary the Democratic vote
will be split among the candidates and, if a high degree of racial bloc
voting is present, the minority candidate will not be supported by a
significant amount of voter crossover. Under the proposed plan,
size. Finding contiguous precincts that satisfy the other requirements and have a
completely equal population balance is impossible.
387. In North Carolina, 63.57% voters are registered Democrats, while 30.80% are
registered Republicans, but this is not an entirely accurate reflection of how the citizens
actually vote, according to the election results comparing votes by precinct with
registration of the precinct. Traditionally, North Carolina, like most of the South, has been
predominantly Democratic. Historically, elections often were determined in the
primaries; for example, there might be three Democratic candidates in the primary, but no
Republican candidate in the general election. Therefore, voters would register as
Democrats in order to have a vote in the election, regardless of their support for the party
platform.
388. This is not to say that districts with minority representation greater than 50%
cannot be drawn. However, such districts cannot be drawn without sacrificing other
factors such as shape or communities of interest.
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District 1, which has an African-American incumbent,3" is a
predominantly rural district with a population that is 45% minority.
This minority percentage is the highest of any of the districts in the
state, but it is not a guaranteed minority electorate. Although this
northeast section of the state has the highest concentration of
minority population, it also has a history of significant racial bloc
voting.3 11 In addition, all of the districts are affected by differences in
the proportion of the total population that is of voting age. Whereas
the districts are allocated based on total population, the voting age
population is smaller. Statistically, when voting age population is
considered, the percentage of the black population that is of voting
age is lower than the percentage of the white population that is of
voting age .3 1  Thus, in District 1, African-Americans comprise only
42.04% of the voting age population, whereas 45.56% of the total
population is African American.
North Carolina's current District 12 is the congressional district
actually declared unconstitutional in Shaw I. The district runs from
Charlotte to Durham, a distance of approximately 150 miles. District
12 has a 56.63% minority population. The District 12 proposed in
this Comment is significantly shorter and more compact. It includes
the heart of Charlotte and extends north to Winston-Salem.
Although wider and more visually appealing than the current
district, it remains somewhat "snaky" in nature. However, this
results in part from the urban and industrial development along
Interstates 85 and 40. As a result of these modifications, the
minority population comprises only 36.91% of the total population
in this district. Depending on the definition used, this technically
does not comprise an influence district. However, the district
maintains its potential as a majority-minority district based on two
389. The current representative is an African-American woman, Eva Clayton.
390. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are subject to § 5 judicial
preclearance, and most of the counties in this district require preclearance. Electoral
results by voting precinct for three statewide elections, which are built into the computer
plan, enable an easy comparison of how individuals actually vote in the area, as opposed to
their registration. One of the races is the 1990 Senate election, a very high-profile race
pitting long-time conservative incumbent Jesse Helms against Harvey Gantt, a liberal
African-American. In the proposed District 1, Harvey Gantt received only 50.29% of the
vote, while the other comparisons-the Lieutenant Governor's race of 1988 and Court of
Appeals race of 1988-resulted in 59.21% and 66.95% support, respectively, for the
Democratic candidate.
391. African-Americans are particularly affected by the difference in voting age
population in determining effective voting equality. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 50,
at 151 n.30. The difference results from the fact that only individuals over the age of 18
are counted in the voting age population. See id. at 118.
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factors. First, the minority population percentage is high enough
within the Democratic party to allow a minority candidate an equal
opportunity to win a primary race. Second, although there is some
history of racial bloc voting in this area1'9 it is less significant than in
other parts of the state. Also, this area has experienced considerably
more growth than most areas of the state, except for the Research
Triangle Park, so the historical racial bloc voting may not continue to
be as pervasive as in other areas." As with the other minority
influence district, the African-American voting-age population is
lower, comprising only 33.48% of the electorate.
Racial considerations also were taken into account in the
southern part of the state. In 1991, when the Justice Department
originally denied approval of the first plan submitted, it noted that
the potential for a second majority-minority district existed in the
south-central portion of the state. District 7 takes this into
consideration.3" Under the proposed plan, 27.78% of the population
in District 7 is black. However, this area is the home of the Lumbee
Indians, and 8.34% of the population within the district is Native-
American. Traditionally, the African-American and Native-
American populations vote together in the general election, but not
in the primary.3" Therefore, while the minority groups in this area
should have a significant impact on elections, the likelihood of
electing a minority candidate is much less significant.
The plan tries to keep self-identified communities together
392. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), challenged state legislative multi-
member districts in Mecklenburg and six other counties. See id. at 35.
393. For example, in the senatorial race of 1990, Harvey Gantt won 61.33% of the vote
in this district. In two other statewide comparisons-the Lieutenant Governor's race of
1988 and the Court of Appeals race of 1988--the Democratic candidate also won this area
but received only 54.6% and 52.68% of the vote respectively. Thus, the minority
candidate actually had greater support.
394. There has been a significant change in the incumbency in this area. In 1991,
Charlie Rose was the long-time Democratic incumbent. Since that time, Rose has retired,
and in 1996 a new Democrat, Mike McIntyre, was elected. Many considered the strong
interest in protecting Rose's seat to be one of the reasons the second majority-minority
district was drawn in the Piedmont area rather than in the south-central part of the state.
Cf. Conference, supra note 86, at 18-19 (arguing that state political concerns led to the
drawing of District 12 in the Piedmont area after preclearance was originally denied).
395. See Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. at 1904 (reviewing the disadvantages of an alternative
proposed plan under which a majority-minority district depended on the cohesion of
African-American and Native-American voters when no such pattern was evident); see
also id. at 1920 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting trial testimony by Gerry Cohen
indicating that these population groups had voted together in statewide elections);
Interview with Gerry Cohen, Director of N.C. Legislative Drafting, in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov.
14,1996) (reconciling these statements regarding North Carolina voting patterns).
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wherever possible. District 3 runs along the coast and includes all of
the Outer Banks. It is registered overwhelmingly Democratic, but
Republican candidates have received a majority of the vote in two of
the three comparison elections. 9 While District 4 splits three
counties, it basically consists of the three municipalities comprising
the Research Triangle Park." This area is influenced by the three
universities comprising the triangle and the high-tech industries their
presence has spawned. Residents in the area commonly live in one
city and commute to another city for work. District 5 runs along the
North Carolina/Virginia border and is a mixed community.
Although most of the voters are registered Democrats, it is a solid
Republican voting district and currently has a Republican
representative." District 6 includes Greensboro and is similar to
District 5. It is also Republican in character and is currently
represented by a Republican.3 District 8 runs through the south-
central area of the state. It is a bipartisan district, but is socially
conservative in its voting.' District 9 picks up the south Charlotte
area and the surrounding counties. It provides a strong Republican
constituency for the incumbent. 1 District 10 is made up of the
northwest corner of the state, a mountain region. It is a strong
Republican district. District 11 includes the lower western mountain
region and is also Republican in voting.
In conclusion, the Hammond Congressional Plan is a politically
balanced plan with two minority influence districts. In addition, it
addresses the need for a compact shape, incumbency protection, and
maintaining communities of interest. The use of minority influence
districts aids in the constitutionality of the district, but could cause it
to run afoul of the additional Voting Rights Act requirements,
discussed in connection with the North Carolina House/Senate Plan
396. The winning percentages were as follows: Senatorial Race, Republican 1990-
55.75%; Lieutenant Governor, Republican 1988-50.84%; Court of Appeals, Democratic
1988-56.1%.
397. The Research Triangle Park is formed by Chapel Hill in Orange County, Durham
in Durham County, and Raleigh in Wake County. Each of these municipalities is the home
of a large university: the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Duke University in
Durham, and North Carolina State University in Raleigh.
398. The current representative is Richard Burr. In the three comparison elections, the
Republican candidate won the election with 61% of the vote in the 1990 Senate race, 54%
in the 1988 Lieutenant Governor race, and 52% in the 1988 Court of Appeals race.
399. Howard Coble is the district's current representative.
400. This determination is extrapolated from previous election results: Senatorial race,
Gantt (D) 42.08%, Helms (R) 57.92%; lieutenant Goveinor, (D) 50.37%, (R) 49.63%;
Court of Appeals, (D) 49.5%, (R) 50.5%.
401. Sue Myrick currently represents District 9.
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in the following appendix.
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING
APPENDIX B: THE NORTH CAROLINA
HOUSE/SENATE CONGRESSIONAL PLAN
On Thursday, March 27, 1997, shortly before the federal court
deadline, the North Carolina legislature approved a new redistricting
proposal that was presented to the three-judge panel for review and
the United States Attorney General's office for preclearance.'
Although a plan drawn by a judicial panel is exempt from the
preclearance requirement, if the judicial panel merely accepts the
legislative plan, then preclearance is still required.' The plan
received preclearance from the United States Department of Justice
on June 9, 1997, but no court has yet ruled on its constitutionality.
Applying the Supreme Court's position on the constitutional
and statutory issues involved in redistricting, the proposed plan
appears to be constitutional. Following is a review of the factors and
considerations.
Shape Contiuity and Race: Each of the twelve districts is
contiguous and as regular in shape as geography and current political
boundaries allow. The proposed plan does not include any district
sections joined by point contiguity, of which the Supreme Court has
been critical.
The proposed District 12 runs 105 miles, as opposed to 160 miles
under the current plan. It is the third shortest of the twelve districts.
Due to the dense, urban population of the district, it contains less
land than most other districts, which may contribute to its "snaky"
appearance. The proposed district is wider than the current one.
The Supreme Court has been critical of extremely narrow districts
using single precincts to reach minority populations, ' but this
district appears sufficiently wide and consistent in nature to counter
this criticism. In addition, it connects the urban centers of three
cities' via an industrial, developed corridor that distinguishes these
areas from other parts of their counties. Only six counties were split
402. See Dennis Patterson, 12th Ditrict Compromise Plan Approved by Senate,
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 28,1997, at A6.
403. See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130,138,153 (1981).
404. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1955. At one point in the northern area of Mecklenburg
County, the district is actually only one precinct wide; however, this precinct is sufficiently
wide and covers all of the towns within this northern portion. See Memorandum, supra
note 361, at 41.
405. The cities of Charlotte, Greensboro, and Winston-Salem are joined by this district.
The Greensboro and Winston-Salem areas in particular are often joined in self-
identification.
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in its creation.4
Supreme Court holdings regarding shape have varied between
the Court's Shaw I statement that in redistricting "appearances do
matter," and its Miller opinion that shape is not determinative. In
Shaw II, the Court tried to establish a middle ground between its
earlier Shaw I and Miller opinions regarding race.4o  Under this
middle ground, the proposed District 12 should be acceptable. If the
Court applies a stricter review of shape, the fact that it is still narrow
may cause it to lose the "beauty pageant." '
District I is considerably more compact and cohesive than in the
original plan. While the current plan is often described as hook-
shaped, it is now a solid mass composed primarily of whole
counties.' The African-American population of District 1 is now
50.27% of the total population.411 However, the African-American
voting age population is only 46.54% of the population;411 thus, while
the district qualifies as a majority-minority district on total
population, it is only an influence district when voting age is
considered.4u
As Justice Stevens noted in his Vera dissent, only majority-
minority district compactness appears to be affected by the most
406. See Memorandum, supra note 361, at 40.
407. See supra notes 133-58 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. The majority of the Supreme Court
did not place strong emphasis on an attractive district, see Shaw H, 116 S. Ct. at 1901
(noting briefly the district court's observation that the district is "'highly irregular' "), but
relied heavily on the "geographically compact" component of § 2 to deny this defense, see
id, at 1906. This should be an appropriate test of whether that is what the Court truly
believes.
409. District 1 contains 10 whole counties and 10 split counties. See Memorandum,
supra note 361, at 29.
410. See id. at 25.
411. See id, at 26. The percentage of African-American registered voters drops even
lower to 44.89% of the population. See id. at 27. While voting-age population could be
used to determine whether a majority-minority district is present, the population of
registered voters probably cannot. Presumably, the difference is that while voting age may
not be controlled, the number of registered voters can be increased through voting drives.
412. This was a serious point of contention for several minority legislators. One
legislator, Representative Mickey Michaux, introduced three alternative maps in the
House voting. Each of the alternatives was defeated but placed into the record. See
Christopher Kirkpatrick, House OKs Compromise Map for Redrawn Districts, HERALD-
SUN (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 27,1997, at Al. Bowing to the political factors of redistricting,
another legislator, Senator Frank Ballance, made it clear that although he voted for the
plan, he believed North Carolina seriously risked losing "the flavor of our congressional
representation" with the redrawn districts, noting that prior to the 1992 elections, under
the unconstitutional plan, it had been 91 years since an African-American represented the
state in Congress. See Submission, supra note 194, at I 97C-28F-4F(2).
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recent Supreme Court opinions.4' District 12 is no longer a majority-
minority district. Under the state's proposed plan it has a total
African-American population of 46.67%. Presumably, this district
may have an extremely bizarre shape without triggering the same
concerns for predominant consideration. Similarly, the shape of all
other districts is unlikely to be considered. However, the boundaries
of all the other districts conform to county and precinct lines with
limited changes to satisfy population requirements, and the following
considerations indicate that race was not the predominant
consideration.
Respect for Political Boundaries: The proposed congressional
district boundaries consistently follow county and precinct lines. The
proposed plan requires twenty-two counties and two precincts to be
split.14 No county has been split by more than two districts, a factor
that seemed to concern the Court in the Shaw I opinion.4" This plan
has a total deviation from population equality of 0.27%.'16 This
deviation is less than the deviation found unconstitutional in Karcher
v. Daggett, but because the Court decided not to issue a safe harbor
of acceptable deviation, it is unclear whether this is still close enough
to zero deviation to satisfy the "one person-one vote" requirement.
Rather than unnecessarily splitting more districts, the legislature
adopted a secondary plan with similar features and no deviation.417
The bill that passed provides that the second plan automatically
becomes the new plan should the original one be found
unconstitutional because the deviation is too great. This plan results
in the splitting of twelve precincts.
Incumbency Protection: Political affiliation registration is an
ineffective guide to voting in North Carolina. Due to heavy
Democratic registration, past election results are a more useful
guide. Using these results, the proposed plan results in a six
Democratic, six Republican district split-the current state
representation.418
The Court has noted two areas of difficulty regarding political
considerations, both of which the plan attempts to address. First,
incumbents have been protected, but not to the point that
incumbents choose their constituency based on their own political
413. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414. See Memorandum, supra note 361, at 19-20.
415. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,636 (1993) (Shaw 1).
416. See Memorandum, supra note 361, at 1.
417. See id.
418. See Patterson, supra note 402, at A6.
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appeal.4' Each of the incumbents remains in a district with a
partisan make-up consistent with the district that each representative
currently represents.4 However, this fact does not mean that the
voters are the same. For instance, while District 4 remains a strong
Democratic district, the current representative, David Price, was
elected from a district with a considerably different electorate
predominantly from Wake and Orange Counties. The proposed
District 4 includes all of Durham County and portions of Person
County and excludes a section of Wake County.4  Thus,
Representative Price will need to identify and establish ties with
local communities to gain reelection.
Second, political affiliation has not been used as a proxy for
race, thereby avoiding strict scrutiny.41 Political affiliation, voting
patterns, past election results, and legislators' experience are all
factors that can be considered in redistricting without triggering strict
scrutiny, so long as such information is not used as a proxy for race.
In North Carolina, the voting information used acceptably identifies
party affiliation and support.
Communities of Interest: The Supreme Court recognizes that
maintaining communities of interest is a valid consideration for
redistricting.4' Each of the districts recognizes and maintains
different communities within North Carolina.' For example,
District 1 is a mix of rural-agriculture and manufacturing areas.
District 3 contains most of the state's coastal regions and adjoining
river basins. The entire Research Triangle area, including the
municipalities of Chapel Hill, Durham, and Raleigh, is contained in
District 4. Districts 10 and 11 consist of the mountain and foothill
regions. District 12 follows the business development corridor along
Interstates 85 and 40 and contains the urban cores of Charlotte,
Greensboro, and Winston-Salem. Although population uniformity
has required some deviation, the proposed plan actually goes beyond
the Supreme Court's requirements by applying the principle of
maintaining communities of interest to all districts, not just to the
plan's majority-minority district.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The proposed plan contains
419. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1954,1961.
420. See Memorandum, supra note 361, at 28.
421. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 412.
422. See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1956.
423. See id.
424. See i. at 1955.
425. The attached map indicates the location of the districts within North Carolina.
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one minority and one influence district. By the Supreme Court
standard of non-retrogression, it should qualify for § 5
preclearance.4 The redrawn Georgia districts spawned the most
recent Supreme Court case on this issue.' In Georgia, the district
court panel drew a plan that reduced the number of majority-
minority districts from three to one.' Various voters and the United
States Attorney General's office challenged this reduction on five
grounds, including a claim that it was retrogressive under § 542 The
Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional 1992 plan was not the
appropriate benchmark for a § 5 comparison.,3  Instead, the
appropriate measure of comparison was the 1982 congressional plan,
containing one majority-minority district out of ten districts.43 The
Court rejected the appellants' argument that with the increase in the
number of Georgia representatives, the minority representation
should maintain the same proportional representation.432 North
Carolina's decrease from two majority-minority districts to one such
district and an influence district is less drastic than Georgia's
decrease in majority-minority districts. Therefore, it, too, will most
likely be acceptable, particularly since it is a true increase of one
over North Carolina's last constitutional plan, which comprised only
ten districts.
Section 2 of the Voting Rghts Act: Each of the Gingles factors is
present in the northeast section of North Carolina, so the failure to
create a majority-minority district risks a challenge from minority
voters under § 2.' While the Supreme Court has not held that
426. See supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text.
427. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
428. See id. at 1929-30.
429. See id. at 1930.
430. See id at 1939.
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. Following the November 1996 general election, Robert Engstrom, a Professor of
Political Science at the University of New Orleans, performed an election analysis similar
to ones he performed during the Shaw litigation. His study focused on the senatorial race
between Jesse Helms and Harvey Gantt, an African-American candidate. Professor
Engstrom's study found that the correlation between racial composition of a district and
voting was statistically significant. Further, he found that in counties in the northeast
region of the state the vote is more racially divided than in the state as a whole. See Letter
from Richard L Engstrom, Professor, University of New Orleans, to Anita S. Hodgkiss,
Attorney, Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham, & Sumter (Feb. 7,1997) (on file with
author). A copy of the letter was sent to each member of the Senate select committee on
redistricting so that the legislators were aware of the continued presence of racial bloc
voting during the redistricting process. See Letter from Anita S. Hodgkiss, Attorney,
Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham, & Sumter, to Senator Roy Cooper, Chair,
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compliance with § 2 is a compelling state interest, a majority of the
Court has taken that position in various opinions. 4 Thus, the
creation of District 1 as a majority-minority district likely will be
considered to be based on a compelling state interest. Further, the
District is concentrated in one quadrant of the state and consists of
ten whole counties and ten split counties. It certainly appears to be
narrowly tailored to meet the compelling state interest.
District 12 is no longer a true majority-minority district, but the
minority population within the district should be capable of
successfully obtaining minority representation. Past election results
available for this area support this proposition.'3 The proposed
District 12 currently is represented by Mel Watt, an African-
American. This district is no longer a majority-minority district, but
it appears winnable for a candidate such as Watt. If a minority were
not elected from this district in the future, the congressperson still
would be representative of the district because a serious candidate
could not afford to be unresponsive to 49% of the population. Thus,
the district remains within the constitutional guidelines. The fact
that success has not been maximized through a majority-minority
district should not expose it to a § 2 challenge.
The use of an influence district in the District 12 area is
particularly advantageous because it bridges the tension between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act. Despite a
minority population of twenty-two percent within the state, the
difficulties in achieving a second compact majority-minority district
exhibit the dispersion of the minority population. The significant
proportion of minorities in the district guarantees that the minority
population will not be neglected by the representative because an
effective political campaign will require platforms that appeal to
biracial communities of voters. This echoes the Supreme Court
position that the right to vote is guaranteed to the individual and not
the group. Influence districts such as District 12 will allow all of the
constituents to elect a representative responsive to their needs and
desires.
While the proposed congressional district plan appears to be
constitutional, the true test may be of the legislative process itself. In
preparing and presenting this plan, the North Carolina legislature
Senate Congressional Redistricting Committee (Mar. 11, 1997) (on file with author).
434. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
435. The election data included in the state program show that Harvey Gantt received
66.49% of the vote from the proposed District 12 in 1990. This indicates that the
population of this district includes enough crossover voters to elect a minority candidate.
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clearly intended to provide its actions with § 2 protection. When the
initial Senate plan was proposed, Senator Roy Cooper, the Chair of
the Senate Select Committee on Redistricting, clearly presented the
factors considered in drawing districts. The legislature considered
geographic fairness, reasonable compactness, communities of
interest, racial fairness, reasonable political fairness, precinct
boundaries, county boundaries when reasonably possible, core
geographic area of the current districts and their incumbents, the
potential to achieve agreement between the House and Senate, and
most importantly, the constitutionality of the plan.43  The
recognition of one majority-minority district and one influence
district was supported by the independent study on racially polarized
voting in North Carolina. These same considerations were
reiterated in the presentations on the House and Senate floor.
Further, when alternate plans with a more cohesive appearance were
presented, the objections to them clearly were based on factors
besides shape that seemed to make the plans unconstitutional. In
addition to racial factors, the legislators focused on maintaining
partisan political balance. Finally, the legislature dedicated itself to
completing this task because the members recognized that it was
their duty, and that if they failed to successfully uphold that duty at
this juncture, the responsibility of redistricting might be removed
from them forever.
Comparing the Hammond Congressional Plan and
House/Senate Proposed Plan, the most significant difference is that
the legislature's proposed plan creates District 1 as a majority-
minority district. Due to the history of racial bloc voting in this area,
and the report showing its continued presence, the legislative
proposal is preferable. However, there are other advantages to the
Hammond proposed plan. For example, in the Hammond plan,
District 7 is a minority-influence district that provides a greater
opportunity for minority influence outside of just Districts 1 and 12.
Considering the sizable African-American and Native-American
populations in this area, this region appears to be another area
where minorities may need to be protected according to § 2
guidelines, particularly if § 2 is found to apply to influence districts in
the future.
The true success of any plan may be measured by its opposition.
Robinson Everett, the attorney who successfully brought the Shaw
436. See Submission, supra note 194, 1 97C-28F-4D(2).
437. See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
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suits, already has stated that he is opposed to the legislature's
proposed plan and plans to challenge it in court because District 12
remains "oddly shaped," insinuating an unconstitutional use of
race."8 Meanwhile, the NAACP and African-American community
leaders are considering challenging the plan for its failure to provide
greater minority representation. The irony is that while the Supreme
Court arguments focused on race, the majority of legislative debate
was over the political balance; both political parties sought to use
this as an opportunity to expand their political base, and they
ultimately secured the status quo.
438. See Christopher Kirkpatrick, Durham Lawyer Going Back to Coun over
Congressional Districs, HERALD-SUN, (Durham, N.C.), Apr. 1,1997, at Al.
[Vol. 752228
C/)
o1 4 !
00
a.'
rA
us 0
0
bO)
~0
C,
